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Foreword 
The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) leads work to create 
the conditions for business success through competitive and flexible markets that 
create value for businesses, consumers and employees. It drives regulatory 
reform, and works across Government and with the regions to raise levels of UK 
productivity. It is also responsible for ensuring an improved quality of life for 
employees and promoting choice and quality for consumers. 
As part of that work the Employment Market Analysis and Research (EMAR) 
branch of the Department manages an extensive research programme to inform 
policy making and promote better regulation on employment relations, labour 
market and equality and discrimination at work issues. 
This report uses the Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 to investigate the 
characteristics which make employees more or less vulnerable to adverse 
treatment in the workplace. The report finds that certain features of the external 
labour market, the product market, the employing organisation and the job, as 
well as characteristics of the employee themselves, each serve to increase the 
likelihood of adverse treatment. 
We hope you find it of interest. Electronic copies of this and all other reports in 
our Employment Relations Research Series can be downloaded from the BIS 
website. A complete list of our research series can be found at the back of this 
report. 
Please contact us at emar@bis.gsi.gov.uk if you wish to be added to our 
publication mailing list, or would like to receive regular email updates on EMAR’s 
research, new publications and forthcoming events. 
 
Bill Wells 
Director, Employment Market Analysis and Research 
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This report uses the Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 to investigate the 
characteristics which make employees more or less vulnerable to adverse 
treatment in the workplace. The report finds that certain features of the external 
labour market, the product market, the employing organisation and the job, as 
well as characteristics of the employee themselves, each serve to increase the 
likelihood of adverse treatment. It is proposed that they do so by influencing the 
balance of power in the employment relationship. The report proposes that 
attention should be given to supporting specific groups of workers, including 
young people, those with long-standing health problems and gay/lesbian or 
bisexual workers. Support should also be given to raising awareness of Acas. 
Aims and objectives 
This report sought to investigate the characteristics which make employees more 
or less vulnerable to adverse treatment in the workplace. The patterns of adverse 
treatment, and the factors which increase employees’ vulnerability to it, were 
explored using the Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 (FTWS 2008).  
The descriptive and multivariate analysis investigated the extent to which 
employees’ reported experience of adverse treatment varied according to a 
range of characteristics relating to the external labour market, the product 
market, their job, their employing organisation and their own personal 
characteristics. The analysis was built upon a conceptual approach which viewed 
adverse treatment as one possible (although not inevitable) consequence of the 
power imbalances which may exist within the employment relationship.  
Background 
FTWS 2008 was a face-to-face survey conducted between September and 
December 2008 among a representative sample of people aged 16 or over who 
were living in Great Britain at the time and who had been in a paid job at any time 
in the two years prior to the survey. A total of 4,010 individuals were interviewed, 
representing a response rate of 57 per cent among those eligible to participate.  
The respondents to FTWS 2008 were asked, amongst other things, about 
problems they had experienced at work. Such problems encompassed issues 
covered by employment rights legislation and more generalised perceptions of 
unfair treatment. The current report seeks to extend the primary analysis of the 
surveyi in order to obtain a richer understanding of the characteristics of 
employees, jobs and workplaces which either increase or decrease the likelihood 
of adverse treatment at work.  
The conceptual framework 
Adverse treatment can be defined as a breach of statutory employment rights; 
company rules and entitlements; custom and practice; or social norms. 
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Employment laws established through a democratic process set minimum 
standards which all employers are obliged to meet. Therefore, an employee who 
works for an employer that fails to comply with employment legislation can be 
regarded as being subject to adverse treatment. In addition, many organisations 
have written rules which detail particular aspects of the employment relationship, 
both in terms of rights and responsibilities for their employees. Again, a breach of 
these rules by the employer can be regarded by the employee as adverse 
treatment. As well as rules and entitlements which are codified, the employer 
may adhere to informal practices which have developed over time within the 
organisation. Whilst these cannot be considered rights, deviating from the normal 
practice can result in employees feeling that they have experienced adverse 
treatment. Finally, there are social norms about acceptable behaviour which 
mean that even treatment which is permitted by statute could be generally 
regarded as unfair. 
The report contends that the experience of adverse treatment is not random, nor 
can it be explained by reference to a small number of characteristics, such as an 
employee’s level of education or the availability of union representation. Instead, 
the report argues that an employee’s vulnerability to adverse treatment is 
determined by the wide range of factors which affect the balance of bargaining 
power between the employee and their employer. If the balance of power is in 
favour of the employee, there is a lower likelihood that they will be subject to 
adverse treatment, since the costs to the employer of treating employees in a 
way which reduces their productivity or causes them to seek alternative 
employment is greater. Conversely, where the balance of power favours the 
employer, there may be less incentive for them to protect their employees 
against adverse treatment. The report proposes a range of factors which may 
affect the balance of power, including the employee’s productivity, their ease of 
finding another job and the degree of competition faced by the employer in the 
product market.  
Headline Findings 
Adverse treatment was found to be more commonly experienced, all other things 
equal, by those with limited options in the external labour market. It was also 
found to be more commonly experienced by those without a written contract of 
employment, those without colleagues with whom they can discuss work-related 
problems, those working in organisations with a poor climate of employment 
relations and those who consider that their employer discriminates in favour of 
certain types of worker. Adverse treatment was also found to be more common 
among younger workers, among those with long-standing health problems and 
those with some/deep financial difficulties. On some indicators, adverse 
treatment was also more common among employees in industries where labour’s 
share of value-added has been squeezed over the past decade. The absence of 
a threat of unionisation, not being heterosexual and a lack of awareness of Acas 
were also found to be important in some of the analyses, but not all.  
Overall, the results of the analysis supported the notion that vulnerability to 
adverse treatment is a function of a variety of characteristics. Some of these 
concern the specific nature of the job that an employee may be doing, but others 
 ix
affect the employment relationship from a distance. There is also considerable 
support for the notion that it is those factors which most affect the balance of 
power within the employment relationship which most readily indicate the degree 
of vulnerability to adverse treatment.  
Conclusions 
These results have a number of implications. First, they suggest that the 
prevalence of adverse treatment may have a cyclical component since 
vulnerability was found to be related to an employee’s ease of re-employment. 
The precise nature of the relationship is difficult to estimate without a longer run 
of data. However, the results suggest that the prevalence of adverse treatment 
may be expected to be greater when employers’ demand for labour is reduced 
such that employees have fewer outside options.  
The results also suggest that adverse treatment may have a sectoral component 
related to the decline in the importance of labour costs within certain industries. 
The prevalence of automation, outsourcing and downsizing more generally may 
thus provide a useful signal of rising employee vulnerability within certain sectors. 
This further suggests that employee vulnerability to adverse treatment in Britain 
may link in to broader competitive processes of demand reallocation and 
globalisation.  
Employees who report that they were experiencing financial difficulties, and who 
might therefore be expected to be particularly dependent upon the continuation 
of their current employment, are more likely to report having experienced 
adverse treatment at work. Policy making therefore needs to include an 
appreciation that factors outside of the employment relationship can influence 
upon how that relationship functions. Younger workers, those with disabilities and 
non-heterosexuals are also each more vulnerable to adverse treatment than their 
counterparts after controlling for other factors. These results suggest that policy 
initiatives could usefully be targeted at groups which have been brought more 
recently under the coverage of anti-discrimination legislation. Initiatives which 
seek to increase employers’ awareness of the ways in which these groups may 
be adversely treated, and initiatives which increase such workers’ capacity to 
protect themselves from adverse treatment – for example by increasing their 
awareness of sources of information and advice such as Acas, are likely to 
reduce the extent of their vulnerability in the future.  
The preceding discussion serves to highlight a further point, which is that 
vulnerability cannot be defined by reference only to a small number of 
characteristics. By highlighting a wide range of factors which influence an 
employee’s vulnerability to adverse treatment at work, the findings serve to 
emphasise that vulnerability is both complex in its make-up and also continuous 
in its nature. It is (in our view) an over-simplification to seek to categorise one 
group of workers who are vulnerable to adverse treatment (implying that the 
remainder are not). Vulnerability is instead a matter of degree. Furthermore, the 
factors which make an employee more vulnerable are wide and varied.  
It is not possible to reach firm conclusions about the direction of causality within a 
cross-sectional dataset such as the Fair Treatment at Work Survey. Also, the 
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reliance on self-reported data by employees means that whether they report 
adverse treatment partly depends on their expectations about how they should 
be treated. However, many of the results do fit the a priori expectations. For this 
reason, it is argued that the analysis and findings provide a valuable insight into 
understanding the correlates of adverse treatment in the workplace. 
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1. Introduction 
This report seeks to investigate the characteristics which make employees more 
or less vulnerable to adverse treatment in the workplace. It is beyond doubt that 
some employees in Britain are adversely treated by their employers. Between 
April 2008 and March 2009 the Employment Tribunals Service ruled in favour of 
the employee in around 22,500 claims, whilst a further 55,000 cases were settled 
via conciliation (Tribunals Service, 2009). Many more cases of adverse treatment 
do not reach an Employment Tribunal.  
The patterns of adverse treatment, and the factors which increase employees’ 
vulnerability to it, are explored using the Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
(hereafter FTWS 2008). FTWS 2008 was a face-to-face survey conducted 
between September and December 2008 among a representative sample of 
people aged 16 or over who were living in Great Britain at the time and who had 
been in a paid job at any time in the two years prior to the survey. A total of 4,010 
individuals were interviewed, representing a response rate of 57 per cent among 
those eligible to participate.  
 
The respondents to FTWS 2008 were asked, amongst other things, about 
problems they had experienced at work. Such problems encompassed issues 
covered by employment rights legislation, such as entitlements to rest breaks or 
parental leave, procedural problems relating to the handling of grievances or 
disciplinary matters, and more generalised perceptions of unfair treatment. Just 
over one quarter (29 per cent) of respondents to the survey reported that they 
had experienced a problem at work in the two years prior to the survey interview. 
The current report seeks to extend the primary analysis of the survey (Fevre et 
al., 2009) in order to obtain a richer understanding of the characteristics of 
employees, jobs and workplaces which either increase or decrease the likelihood 
of perceived adverse treatment.  
 
The analysis is built upon a conceptual approach which views adverse treatment 
as one possible (although not inevitable) consequence of the power imbalances 
which may exist within the employment relationship. The central hypothesis is 
that there are certain features of the employment relationship, and of the wider 
product and labour markets within which it is constructed, which tilt the balance 
of power more in the favour of the employer or the employee. Those factors 
which tilt the balance more in the favour of the employer increase the likelihood 
of adverse treatment whilst those factors which tilt the balance more in the favour 
of the employee decrease it. The report proposes a number of such factors 
through reference to the wider literature encompassing economics, industrial 
relations and economic sociology. It then seeks to examine their importance 
through statistical analysis of the data from FTWS 2008.  
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2. Adverse treatment and 
vulnerability 
2.1 The concept of adverse treatment 
The research project is concerned to investigate patterns of adverse treatment 
that occur within British workplaces1. One must therefore begin with some 
concept of how adverse treatment might be defined. This has both objective and 
subjective elements and can be considered under four headings: statutory 
employment rights; company rules and entitlements; custom and practice; and 
social norms.  
One objective benchmark can be set, within any country, by reference to its 
specific (and often detailed) system of employment rights. In the UK, this system 
of rights includes laws governing such issues as working time, rates of pay, equal 
treatment and grounds for dismissal. Typically, these rights set minimum 
standards to which all employers are bound to adhere. Within the UK, these 
statutory rights originate in Parliament as a product of the normal democratic 
process by which laws are established, and so can reasonably be considered to 
specify objective boundaries beyond which employer behaviour can only be 
judged negatively.  
Further objective benchmarks exist within individual organisations. Many 
organisations have written rules and entitlements, typically contained in an 
employee handbook, which codify certain aspects of the employment 
relationship. These might cover the exact nature of any extra-statutory benefits to 
which employees are entitled, such as the level and duration of any extra-
statutory maternity pay. Alternatively, they might specify the procedural rules 
which must be adhered to, or the criteria which must be applied, for example 
when considering an employee’s suitability for promotion. Edwards (1993: 34-5) 
uses the term ‘enterprise rights’ to describe such codified, organisation-specific 
rules. Since they set explicit expectations about the way in which the 
employment relationship is to be conducted, any infringements of these rules by 
the employer can reasonably be considered by the employee to constitute 
adverse treatment.  
A third category of rules comprises those which arise from custom and practice. 
These constitute informal (but shared) understandings which have developed 
over time within the organisation. Such understandings are based upon an 
acknowledgement of how things have been done in the past, but they form a 
frame of reference which shapes how the employment relationship operates - or 
can be expected to operate - in the present. As Edwards (1993: 34) points out, 
                                            
1 Adverse treatment may also occur in the wider labour market if employees are unfairly denied 
access to employment. However, forms of ill treatment which take place outside of an existing 
relationship between an employer and a worker are outside the scope of this research.  
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such informal rules are not codified and so do not necessarily have the status of 
‘rights’, yet they still frame the boundaries of acceptable behaviour and conduct. 
They might govern employees expectations about how annual leave will be 
allocated over Christmas, or whether someone who takes time off at short notice 
to care for a sick child can expect to be paid for those hours2. Because rules 
which rely on past custom and practice are not written down, they may be subject 
to differing interpretations. Whether an infringement (and thus adverse treatment) 
has occurred may thus be more of a subjective judgement than in the case of 
statutory rights or enterprise rights. However, employer behaviour which is 
considered to contravene existing custom and practice in the organisation may 
be considered unfair by the recipient.  
The fourth and final category of rules comprises those which arise from the 
application of wider social norms. These are typically concerned with issues of 
fairness and mutual respect, whereby infringements (“workplace incivilities” in the 
language of Roscigno et al., 2009) may be considered to breach certain widely-
held tenets of appropriate behaviour. Of course, many such issues are covered 
by statutory rights or enterprise-based rules: some organisations will have explicit 
policies on bullying, for example. In other organisations, the acceptability of such 
behaviours may be governed by social norms. They often precede statute. For 
instance, there was, until 2006, no law against discrimination on basis of age, 
sexual orientation or religion. However, prior to the introduction of this legislation 
many would nevertheless have seen any such discrimination which took place as 
unfair and thus constituting adverse treatment under moral grounds, even in 
organisations without an equal opportunities policy.  
Adverse treatment may thus be defined by reference to a variety of different 
rules. These are not all common. As a consequence, what constitutes adverse 
treatment for one person whose employment relationship operates within a 
highly-codified set of company rules, or is shaped by a mutually-accepted set of 
high moral standards, may not necessarily constitute adverse treatment for 
someone else whose employment relationship operates largely with reference 
only to statutory rights. It would be possible to adopt a narrow definition of 
adverse treatment which was concerned only with infringements of statutory 
employment rights. However, this would ignore the fact that most employees 
enter into an employment relationship on the understanding that a broader set of 
rules will apply, and who can thus reasonably consider that they have been 
unfairly treated when those rules are not followed. Our preferred perspective on 
the concept of ‘adverse treatment’ is thus broader than statute and encompasses 
any contravention of the explicit or implicit rules of engagement under which the 
employment relationship has either been conceived or has developed.  
One consequence of adopting this broader perspective is that the occurrence of 
adverse treatment can only be fully determined by the parties to the employment 
contract. This places the emphasis firmly on self-reporting, which brings its own 
limits. First some employees may be unaware of their rights or entitlements. On 
the one hand this may lead to a situation in which they are unaware that they 
have been adversely treated. Fevre et al. (2009, p.20) show that some 
                                            
2 This assumes that the firm does not have codified rules which cover such situations.  
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employees are unaware of certain statutory employment rights, something which 
could lead to the under-measurement of adverse treatment in survey-based 
studies. On the other hand, a lack of awareness (particularly of the detail of 
company rules) may lead to a situation in which individuals consider that they 
have been adversely treated when they have not. In practice, however, there is 
little that can be done to adjust for such biases.  
A second limitation is that an employer and his/her employee may differ in their 
opinion of whether an infringement has occurred, particularly when the behaviour 
is governed by uncodifed rules (i.e. custom and practice or social norms). 
Specifically, they may have varied interpretations of the ‘unwritten rules’ which 
exist in the organisation. Again, there is little that can be done in a survey-based 
study to address this limitation: one must simply accept the respondent’s version 
of events. The only feasible alternative (within the constraints of a quantitative 
approach) is to restrict one’s attention to data sources containing objective 
judgements. However, this limits one to an analysis of Employment Tribunal 
judgements, which brings its own biases because of various factors which serve 
to dissuade some employees with valid claims from pursuing them via this route.  
2.2 The concept of vulnerability 
Having considered the notion of ‘adverse treatment’, the discussion now turns to 
the concept of ‘vulnerability’.  
The classical discourse on labour market outcomes is dominated by the notion of 
efficiency. If employers and workers can interact as equals in perfectly 
competitive markets, pursuit of their own self-interest will generate socially 
optimal outcomes. In other words, perfect competition is assumed to prevent 
adverse treatment from persisting since employers will be unable to hire or retain 
employees in the long run under conditions which workers consider undesirable, 
all things considered. However, as Kaufman (1989), Budd (2004: 15-18) and 
many others have noted, there are imperfections in product and labour markets 
which interfere with the equality of bargaining power which might otherwise exist 
between employers and workers. These imperfections include: barriers to entry 
into product and labour markets; restrictions on firm and worker mobility; rigidities 
in price-setting and wage-fixing; and information asymmetries. Such factors 
affect the balance of power because they affect the extent to which an employer 
depends upon an employee and vice versa.  
The ‘power-dependence’ approach (Martin, 1977; Bacharach and Lawler, 1981), 
which originates from a sociological perspective, seeks to explain the distribution 
of power in terms of such patterns of interdependence between parties. As 
Martin (1992: 26) points out: 
• an increase in the dependence of A on B increases B’s absolute 
bargaining power; whilst 
• an increase in the ratio of A’s dependence on B to B’s dependence on A 
increases B’s relative bargaining power.  
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It has long been argued that labour is more dependent upon management than 
the reverse. Marshall (1920: 471), for example, highlighted the dependence of 
workers on continuous employment, due to the perishable nature of their labour 
power and the typical absence of a source of alternative income. However, whilst 
this may be the case on average, Martin (1992: 27) rightly notes that, in practice, 
“the pattern of dependencies is variable, being influenced by product and labour-
market conditions, and a range of other economic, political, social and cultural 
factors”. The degree of an employer’s dependence upon an employee, for 
instance, will be influenced by the employee’s productivity, whilst the employee’s 
dependence upon their employer will be influenced by the availability of 
alternative employment. Section 2.3 provides a more extensive discussion.  
If the imbalance of power tips in the favour of the employer, this creates an 
opportunity for the employer to shape the employment relationship in their favour. 
This may usually be done with the employee’s explicit approval (i.e. through 
negotiation) or with the employee’s implicit consent if the outcome is seen as 
reasonable in the circumstances. However, employers may sometimes act 
unilaterally in ways which do not meet with the employee’s approval. The 
opportunities for the employer to do so are accentuated by the indeterminacy of 
the labour contract, which typically fails to specify in full the rights and 
responsibilities of either party, thereby creating uncertainties over the precise 
behaviours and outcomes which are expected on either side.  
Patterns of dependence which increase the bargaining power of the employer 
can thus be expected to increase the likelihood of adverse treatment and thus 
increase an employee’s vulnerability, whilst patterns of dependence which 
increase the bargaining power of the employee can be expected to reduce it (see 
Figure 1)3.  
Figure 1: The balance of power and vulnerability to adverse treatment in the employment 
relationship 
 




 Less vulnerable 
 
The importance of the distribution of power has been acknowledged in some 
parts of the previous literature on vulnerability (see for example: Hudson, 2006: 
6; TUC Commission on Vulnerable Employment, 2008: 12; Pollert and 
Charlwood, 2009: 344). However, this literature has not tended to consider the 
wide range of factors which can affect power or dependence. Specifically, it has 
                                            
3 It is important to emphasise that the outcome is not pre-determined. An employer or employee 
may not seek to exercise the power that they hold; nor will they inevitably seek to exercise it in 
their own self-interest to the detriment of the other (see Edwards and Wajcman, 2005: 118-120).  
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tended to characterise vulnerability by referring only to a restricted set of job 
characteristics. Hudson (2006), for example, characterised ‘vulnerable workers’ 
as those earning below one third of the median hourly wage and who do not 
have their terms and conditions negotiated by a trade union, whilst Pollert and 
Charlwood (2009) adopted a similar approach, identifying the vulnerable as those 
earning below median hourly earnings and without the support of a trade union4. 
The TUC’s Commission on Vulnerable Employment (2008) characterised those 
‘at high risk of being in vulnerable work’ as those who are paid less than £6.50 
per hour and who either have no academic qualifications, have non-permanent 
contracts or work at home, plus all undocumented migrant workers and those 
working in the informal economy. 
Such categorisations, which appeal only to a small set of factors, lend 
themselves helpfully to the quantification of so-called ‘vulnerable employment’. 
However, their simplistic nature (arising, it could be argued, from their largely 
atheoretic origins) ultimately undermine their usefulness. In contrast to these 
previous attempts to characterise vulnerability, the preceding discussion 
hopefully makes it clear not only that vulnerability should be considered strictly as 
a continuum, rather than as a discrete state, but also that an individual’s position 
on that continuum is likely to be determined by a wide range of factors, both 
within and outside the workplace. 
This more comprehensive and nuanced approach does, however, have much in 
common with existing work by O’Regan et al. (2005) and Taylor (2008) which 
focuses on the notions of risk and capacity. ‘Risk’ is considered to relate to the 
likelihood that an individual is exposed to adverse treatment, whilst ‘capacity’ is 
considered to relate to their ability to protect themselves from it. Within this 
framework, an employee is considered to be ‘vulnerable’ when their risk of 
exposure is high and their capacity to protect themselves is low. O’Regan et al. 
(2005: 12-35) and Taylor (2007: 24-27) seek to identify sets of risk factors and 
capacities which may be relevant in understand patterns of adverse treatment. In 
practice, however, many characteristics of workers, jobs or firms contribute to 
both aspects of this schema. Difficulties with the English language, for instance, 
may be expected both to raise the risk of adverse treatment (by limiting the 
worker’s outside job options and thus increasing their reliance on their present 
employer) and also simultaneously to lower the employee’s capacity to protect 
themselves (by limiting their access to advice and information). It is therefore 
arguably more helpful, and conceptually more valid, to consider risk factors as 
those which increase the relative bargaining power of the employer and 
capacities as those which increase the relative bargaining power of the 
employee. It is this notion of power which seems fundamental to a proper 
conceptualisation of vulnerability.  
                                            
4 Hudson and Pollert and Charlwood did, however acknowledge that the degree of vulnerability 
would be accentuated among certain subsets such as those in non-standard jobs and those 
without legal immigration status. 
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2.3 Factors affecting the balance of power in the employment 
relationship 
The preceding section has put forward the hypothesis that the extent of an 
employee’s vulnerability to adverse treatment by the employer may be explicable 
by reference to certain characteristics of their employment relationship, rather 
than arising primarily as the outcome of random, and thus unpredictable, events. 
The present section proposes a range of specific features of jobs and 
employment which may be expected to make the adverse treatment of 
employees by their employers either more or less likely. This section therefore 
puts forward the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical analysis.  
The characteristics are discussed under five headings: the external labour 
market; the external product market; the employer or firm; the job; and the 
employee. The full range of factors considered here is presented in  
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Figure 2: Factors affecting the conduct of the employment relationship 
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some monopsony power over their employees (see Manning, 2003, for an 
extensive discussion).  
The employee’s reported ease of re-employment, were they to lose their job, thus 
provides an indicator of where the balance of power lies in respect of the 
influence of the external labour market. Aggregate measures of the state of the 
external labour market may be complementary. One often cited measure is the 
ratio of unemployed persons to vacancies, which can be constructed for the 
travel-to-work area within which a worker resides. High ratios would indicate 
greater power on the part of employers, as they would be assumed to have a 
greater stock of unemployed workers from which to recruit if a vacancy were to 
arise. However, this measure has the considerable limitation that it assumes that 
any unemployed person is a qualified substitute for any incumbent worker. 
Manning (2003: 44-49) thus proposes an alternative which measures the fraction 
of new recruits hired from non-employment. He shows that those groups who 
tend to do badly in the labour market in terms of wages also tend to be those 
more frequently hired from non-employment (p.49), thus providing support for the 
notion that the measure provides an indicator of employer power. One could 
expect that, in aggregate, this may be best measured across occupations in 
order to capture the specificity of skill.  
Characteristics of the external product market 
The degree of power that an employer holds in their product market will 
necessarily shape their approach to the employment relationship as it will 
determine their freedom of movement in respect of labour costs. Features of the 
external product market can therefore be expected to affect the balance of power 
within the employment relationship and thus to affect the probability of adverse 
treatment. 
An employer will have more power in their product market when the level of 
demand for their product or service is high and the degree of competition from 
other firms is low. In this situation, the employer will command greater control 
over prices than if demand were low or competition high. Labour costs need not 
pose a significant constraint to the generation of profits when an employer 
possesses such ‘discretionary pricing power’ (Mishel, 1986, cited by Martin, 
1992), and so employees are afforded a degree of power themselves when 
seeking to maintain or raise the standards of employment. There are limits of 
course but the key point is that, when an employer faces external pressure in 
their product market, this is likely to raise their bargaining power in relation to 
their workers since labour costs must be constrained if the firm is to remain 
profitable and, ultimately, if jobs are to survive.  
The degree of discretionary pricing power held by the employer is difficult to 
measure directly. It would be indicated by the overall level of demand and the 
degree of competition in the product market (see Mahajan, 2005, for one 
measure of the latter). However, it would also be proxied by levels of profitability, 
which have been shown to be correlated with the generosity of pay settlements 
(Blanchflower et al., 1990; Forth and Millward, 2000). One might also expect 
rising employer power to be indicated by a squeeze on labour costs, which could 
be the product either of downsizing or of lower-than-average wage increases. In 
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a meta-analysis of over 200 workplace ethnographies, Roscigno et al. (2009) 
found that downsizing and workplace restructuring were positively associated 
with the probability of supervisory bullying.  
Characteristics of the employer or firm 
Characteristics of the employer which may affect the balance of power vis a vis 
employees include the production regime, the financial health of the firm and the 
governance regime. The financial health of the firm has already been discussed 
indirectly in the preceding paragraphs.  
The nature of production may be relevant to the balance of power in so far as 
different production regimes rely more or less on the consent and active 
engagement of employees. Lean production, with its emphasis on production 
efficiency, and high-involvement management, with its focus on employee 
initiative and flexibility, both afford employees a degree of power through such 
avenues. Indeed, high-involvement management has been shown in some 
studies to be positively associated with employee wages (Forth and Millward, 
2004). In practice, however, the production regime is likely to be difficult to 
measure in a survey with no matched employer component.  
Size of firm is likely to serve as a proxy for a relative lack of power in product 
markets, since many small firms are constrained by their dependence on large 
firms (e.g. Moule, 1998). However, whilst some would suggest that employment 
outcomes in small firms are then necessarily bad (Rainnie, 1989), others would 
contend that the informal approach to employment relations which tends to 
characterise smaller firms can lead to a variety of outcomes. Indeed, analysis of 
the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (Forth et al., 2006) showed 
employees’ perceptions of the quality of employment relations to be most 
favourable in small firms. It could be that a less professional approach to HR 
management and a lower degree of proceduralisation, which might otherwise be 
expected to provide protections against adverse treatment, are compensated by 
a less rigid and more consensual management style. Roscigno et al. (2009) also 
suggest that the alienating or anonymous nature of work in large organisations 
may encourage uncivil behaviour. Finally, it has been proposed that, in 
particularly small firms, family ties to the owner may reduce the likelihood of 
conflict (Ram and Edwards, 2010: 247), although it seems equally plausible that 
the absence of formal boundaries in family relationships may increase it.  
At the other extreme of the size distribution, many public sector organisations – 
which tend to be very large – set out to be ‘model employers’, thus providing 
good examples to the private sector by practicing fairness and equity in the 
treatment of their workforces (Fredman and Morris, 1989). Average conditions in 
the public sector may be contrasted with those in the ‘third sector’ (e.g. charities), 
although it is not clear whether organisation size or the nature of the governance 
regime may be the defining characteristic, or whether it is in fact the differing 
market conditions which such organisations face. Public sector organisations 
have traditionally been less exposed to competitive market forces, whereas the 
market for funds in the third sector is often very competitive.  
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Unionisation is a further characteristic of the employer or firm which can be 
expected to indicate the degree of worker vulnerability to adverse treatment, 
since one would expect – all other things equal – that those employees who are 
represented by trade unions are less vulnerable to unilateral action by their 
employer. Although the power of trade unions has declined in aggregate over the 
past quarter century, unions are still found to have a positive impact on 
employment conditions such as wages (Bryson and Forth, 2010a). They may 
also increase the likelihood that problems can be worked through, by helping to 
ensure that problems are addressed within the workplace rather than resulting in 
the dismissal or resignation of the employee (Bryson and Forth, 2010b). Further, 
there may be spill-over effects on employees in non-union firms, since non-union 
employers may avoid treating their employees adversely for fear that it will raise 
the probability that their firm becomes a target for union organisation. Non-union 
employees are likely to have greater bargaining power vis a vis their employer if 
the unionisation rate elsewhere in their industry is high (see Belfield and 
Heywood, 2001, for evidence in respect of wage rates)5.   
Worker vulnerability to adverse treatment may necessarily be greater in cases 
where the employer is unaware of certain features of the statutory framework of 
employment rights. The 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey indicated 
that two-fifths (42 per cent) of workplaces with 5 or more employees had no 
personnel specialist available either on-site or at a higher level within the 
organisation (Kersley et al., 2006: 41). In the absence of a knowledgeable 
insider, employers may obtain advice from HR service centres, professional legal 
firms and from providers of free information such as Acas and Business Link. 
However, WERS 2004 showed that external sources of advice tend to be used 
more where specialists are present than where they are absent (p.53). Some 
managers may therefore operate on a less than complete understanding of the 
statutory minima, which may raise the risk of mistakes.  
Finally, employers’ behaviour towards their workforce will be shaped, not only by 
their knowledge, but also by norms and expectations about how the employment 
relationship should be conducted and how the wider firm should be run. One 
dimension is the extent to which an employer prefers autocracy to democracy, in 
other words their preference for enforcing management prerogative by coercion 
rather than consensus (Bacon, 2008). The autocratic employer attempts to force 
the balance of power in their favour by restricting the scope of what may be 
contested by the employee. Adverse treatment may then be more likely if other 
determinants are present, whilst problems may also prove more difficult to 
resolve. Management styles are themselves difficult to measure, but a more 
autocratic approach may be expected to lead to a less favourable climate of 
employment relations than a more democratic approach, and so the general 
climate that exists within the whole firm may be a valuable proxy.  
Another dimension of the employer’s approach which has the clear potential to 
affect the likelihood of adverse treatment is whether the employer adopts a 
wholly meritocratic approach within the employment relationship. Some 
                                            
5 The threat of unionisation to non-union firms could equally be considered a characteristic of the 
external labour market.  
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employers, given leeway by imperfections in product and labour markets, may 
discriminate against certain groups of employees on grounds other than 
productivity. Such actions may arise directly as a result of ‘tastes’, or indirectly as 
the result of mis-placed assumptions or through the imposition of unnecessary 
requirements (Dean and Liff, 2010). Three per cent of successful Employment 
Tribunal Claims in 2008/9 concerned discrimination on at least one of the 
statutory grounds (Tribunals Service, 2009), indicating that a non-meritocratic 
approach continues to affect some employers’ decisions.  
Characteristics of the job 
Many characteristics of the job held by an employee provide an indication of the 
likely balance of power between employer and employee at the time of 
recruitment. However, many such characteristics can also be expected to affect 
the balance of power as the employment relationship develops, and thus to affect 
the probability of adverse treatment.  
The presence or absence of a written contract of employment can be expected to 
affect the balance of power within the employment relationship since the 
existence of a written contract is an important factor in helping to determine 
whether a worker has the status of an employee and is thus eligible to take 
advantage of statutory employment rights. Workers without a written contract 
may find it more difficult to prove their status and this may accentuate their 
vulnerability to adverse treatment. 
Similarly, whether an employment relationship is intended to be temporary or 
permanent (that is, without an agreed end date) may be relevant. Employers may 
be expected to have a greater degree of power in relation to temporary workers 
than in relation to employees on permanent contracts, since temporary workers 
are dependent upon the employer to renew their contract at the end of its term.  
Employees with low tenure may be more vulnerable to adverse treatment 
because a minimum of one year’s service is required in order to make a claim for 
unfair dismissal to an Employment Tribunal6. The exclusion of many low-tenure 
workers from the statutory protections against unfair dismissal thus shifts the 
balance of power in favour of the employer in such situations. Longer tenure may 
also afford further protections, however, since longer service can be expected to 
result in the acquisition of firm-specific skills and experience which make the 
worker more productive and more difficult to replace.  
Employers are also likely to be more dependent upon workers at higher positions 
in the occupational hierarchy, as they may rely on them to assist in the 
supervision of employees in lower grades and to participate in the management 
of the workplace more generally. Similarly, an employer is also likely to be more 
dependent on those occupations who are most central to the process of 
production or service delivery than on those occupations which relate to 
‘backroom’ activities, all other things equal. These ‘core’ groups may not 
necessarily be those at the top of the hierarchy.  
                                            
6 The exception concerns dismissals which are considered automatically unfair because they are 
related to issues such as union membership or pregnancy.  
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Centrality to the production process may also be indicated by the scale of an 
individual’s labour inputs, however, with employers likely to have a greater 
degree of dependence upon full-time employees than upon those on part-time 
contracts. The importance of replacing a full-time worker will necessarily be 
greater than replacing someone who works only one day per week, since the 
production process is likely to suffer more in the absence of the full-time worker if 
their jobs are otherwise similar. This would suggest that full-time workers may be 
less vulnerable to adverse treatment. It is also the case that some part-time 
workers depend upon their employer for a particular working pattern which fits in 
with caring responsibilities and which may be difficult to replicate elsewhere 
(Grimshaw and Rubery, 2010: 370). On the other hand, it may also be noted that 
the full-time worker may be more reliant on their job to sustain their household 
income than may be the case for the part-time worker, thus creating a greater 
financial dependence on the continuation of the employment relationship and 
hence opening up a point of vulnerability. 
A final job characteristic which may be associated with the degree of vulnerability 
to adverse treatment is the extent of social support available to an employee 
from work colleagues within the organisation. Such social support is necessarily 
less formal than trade union representation. However, it indicates a collective 
aspect to the job which is nonetheless likely to afford some degree of power to 
the employee in both resisting and addressing adverse treatment. Those 
employees who have colleagues with whom they can discuss their work-related 
experiences, and from whom they can obtain advice and encouragement, may 
thus be considered less vulnerable to adverse treatment, whilst more isolated 
employees, on the other hand, may be considered more vulnerable.  
Characteristics of the employee 
The final set of characteristics considered here concern the individual employee 
themselves. The principal among these is the individual’s productivity which, as 
already mentioned, plays an important role in shaping the extent of the 
employer’s dependence upon the individual worker. The productivity of individual 
workers is difficult to measure, but is proxied (albeit imperfectly) by their 
academic qualifications and their age.  
Academic ability and age may also indicate a worker’s self-confidence, which 
may affect their ability to obtain a satisfactory resolution to any problem which 
may arise. Age is, however, one demographic characteristic – along with gender, 
ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation and so on – which may also make an 
individual more likely to experience adverse treatment, if their employer does not 
take a fully meritocratic approach to their workforce. As noted above, some 
employers discriminate unfairly against members of certain demographic groups. 
Membership of a group which has traditionally been disadvantaged in the labour 
market can thus be expected to raise the chances of adverse treatment. 
As noted earlier, those with caring responsibilities may rely upon their employer 
for a certain pattern of working hours or for a degree of understanding and 
flexibility in allowing them to react to emergencies outside of work. To the extent 
that this creates a dependence upon the goodwill of the employer, it is likely to 
shift the balance of power in the employment relationship in favour of the 
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employer and thus to increase the employee’s likelihood of being adversely 
treated under the framework proposed here. It should also be acknowledged, 
however, that the presence of caring responsibilities may also create specific 
opportunities for tension to arise between work and non-work responsibilities, 
and thus create a space for problems to arise which may otherwise have 
remained absent.  
The financial health of the worker’s household is also likely to affect the balance 
of power in the employment relationship since, as Marshall noted (1920: 471), 
workers who have no other source of income are inevitably dependent upon the 
continued availability of work in order to sustain their standard of living. Workers 
who are struggling to manage financially will be heavily dependent upon their 
employer. Equally, employees will be more dependent upon their employer if 
their job provides them with accommodation or transport. Those employees who 
have no financial difficulties and who manage easily can thus be expected to less 
vulnerable to ill-treatment.  
Finally, an individual’s vulnerability to adverse treatment can be expected to be 
reduced by the availability of social support, in the form of family or friends, 
although the benefit might be expected to be less than that provided by support 
from work colleagues (see earlier). The probability of adverse treatment can also 
be expected to be reduced by a greater awareness of employment rights or, at 
least, by awareness of where information and advice can be obtained. Many 
individuals may not know the detail of some statutory employment protections 
until they become salient to their specific situation. The more important factor 
may then be whether the employee is aware of the various sources of 
information and advice, such as Acas and the network of Citizens Advice 
Bureaux.  
2.4 Summary 
This section has thus discussed a wide range of factors which may be expected 
to affect the balance of power or the pattern of dependence in the employment 
relationship, and which may therefore be expected to either increase or reduce 
the likelihood that an employee will be adversely treated. These characteristics 
range from features of the external labour and product markets, to characteristics 
of the job, employer and the employee themselves. Many of these characteristics 
are observed in FTWS 2008. The next chapter of the report goes on to discuss 
how their relationships with the probability of adverse treatment will be 
investigated empirically.  
3. Data and methods 
3.1 Data 
 
FTWS 2008 was conducted face-to-face between September and December 
2008 among a representative sample of people aged 16 or over living who were 
living in Great Britain at the time and who had been in a paid job at any time in 
the two years prior to the survey. FTWS 2008 combined questions that focused 
on individuals’ awareness of statutory employment rights and sources of advice 
(previously covered by the 2005 Employment Rights at Work Survey) with 
questions which focused on employees’ perceptions of unfair treatment at work 
(previously covered in FTWS 2005).  
 
The sample was drawn from the small-user Postcode Address File using a multi-
stage random probability design. The population of addresses was first stratified 
by Government Office Region (GOR) and, within each GOR, geographic areas 
(defined using Super Output Areas (SOA) in England and Wales and pairs of 
Data Zones in Scotland) were ordered by the percentage of non-manual workers. 
Some 440 geographic areas were then selected with probability proportional to 
the size of the employee population in the GOR; these served as primary 
sampling units. The use of a fixed sampling interval with a randomly-allocated 
starting point ensured that the selected PSUs were representative in respect of 
the share of non-manual workers. Thirty three addresses were then issued at 
random within each SOA.  
All sampled addresses were sent a letter in advance of the interviewer’s first visit, 
giving a brief introduction to the survey. Upon arrival at the address, the 
interviewer first sought to identify all eligible persons in the household and one 
eligible person was then selected at random to be invited to take part in the 
survey7.  A total of 4,010 individuals were successfully interviewed, with an 
estimated response rate of 57 per cent8.  
Weights were derived by TNS-BMRB for each respondent. These consisted of a 
design weight to correct for unequal probabilities of selection (see above) 
multiplied by a non-response weight derived through post-stratification of the 
design-weighted sample to the Labour Force Survey using a matrix combining 
age, gender and Government Office Region. All estimates presented in this 
report have been produced using weighted data. The impact of the complex 
                                            
7 In instances where an address contained more than one household, one household was 
selected at random and eligibility was then determined among the individuals within that 
household. 
8  The response rate is estimated by dividing the total number of successful interviews (4,010) by 
the total number of adults estimated to be eligible for the survey (comprising 5,903 adults 
confirmed to be eligible plus 1,092 estimated to be eligible among those whose eligibility was 
unknown). The figure of 1,092 is computed by applying the eligibility rate among those cases 
where eligibility was established (48.5%) to those 2,252 unproductive cases where eligibility was 
not established (typically cases in which no contact was made with the household or in which 
contact was made but the household refused to participate in the eligibility screening exercise).  
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sample design in inflating standard errors is captured through the use of a 
linearized variance estimator. 
A more detailed discussion of the methodology of FTWS 2008 is provided by 
Prior et al. (2009).  
3.2 Measures of adverse treatment 
Two measures of adverse treatment were compiled from the survey. The 
construction of the indicators is described below, whilst the wording of each 
survey question that was used in their compilation is provided in full in Annex A. 
A generalised measure of perceived adverse treatment is created from questions 
which ask whether, in the two years prior to the survey interview, the respondent 
had experienced any of the following: 
• a problem to do with their “rights at work” in any of a set of specified areas 
(question 5.2); 
• unfair treatment in comparison to others at their workplace (question 5.4); 
• discrimination at work (question 5.5); 
• sex-based harassment (question 5.6); 
• other forms of bullying and harassment that create a hostile working 
environment (question 5.7). 
The list of possible areas for ‘rights at work’ was broadly targeted at issues in 
which there are statutory provisions, including pay, working time, time off for the 
care of dependants and the resolution of disputes. However, whilst the list 
included specific statutory rights, such as the right to unpaid parental leave and 
the right to a written contract, it also included issues that were described in more 
general terms, such as ‘taking rest breaks’. Problems reported in these areas 
may not necessarily have related to the statutory provisions9. Those ‘problems’ 
which were reported on this item are thus not considered to be restricted to 
perceived infringements of statutory rights, which is helpful given the discussion 
in Section 2.1. 
However, there are two potential limitations to the question about ‘rights at work’. 
The first concerns the use of the term ‘problems’. Pollert and Charlwood (2009: 
345-6) contend – on the basis of cognitive testing for their Unrepresented Worker 
Survey (URWS) – that workers at the lower end of the labour market (for 
example, those in lower-paid job) may be less likely to describe a particular 
experience as a ‘problem’ than those who are used to better working conditions. 
                                            
9 In the case of rest breaks, for example, the problem experienced by the respondent may have 
related to the statutory right to at least 20 minutes rest in every six-hour block of working time, but 
it may equally have related to the receipt of an extra-statutory benefit (if their employer typically 
provided rest breaks in excess of the statutory minimum) or something non-statutory (such as 
where the employee may be permitted to go within the workplace during their break). 
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In other words, those who are most likely to experience adverse treatment may 
come to regard it as a normal feature of working life; this could lead to the under-
reporting of adverse treatment in FTWS. The URWS thus adopted terms such as 
‘difficulty’, ‘concern’ or ‘worry’ and then used prompts to exclude more trivial 
concerns. However, there is no reliable way of knowing the extent to which this 
approach may have elicited a different pattern of responses in FTWS. The 
second limitation concerns the use of the phrase ‘rights of work’ which, as Pollert 
and Charlwood also note (2009: 346), requires some awareness of these rights. 
However, FTWS does at least obtain measures of the respondent’s awareness of 
certain statutory provisions and these are included in our models as controls in 
an attempt to correct for biases10.  
Those adopting a pluralist perspective on the employment relationship might 
separately take issue with the general measure of perceived adverse treatment, 
however, contending that problems will often occur as some degree of conflict 
between management and labour is inevitable, given the indeterminacy of the 
employment contract and the contested nature of the wage/effort bargain. One 
might therefore reasonably expect problems or disputes to arise at work, but 
equally expect that many of these are resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both 
parties. This may be the case, for example, if a problem arises through an 
individual’s misunderstanding about the nature of their entitlements. Such 
instances do not constitute conclusive evidence of adverse treatment. A more 
restricted indicator of adverse treatment might then focus on the manner in which 
problems are addressed. If a problem or dispute can be successfully resolved, 
this would be indicative of a transient issue to which a mutually-agreeable 
solution has been found.  
Respondents to the survey were asked whether the problem or dispute they had 
reported as having occurred in the two years prior to the survey was over or 
whether it was still ongoing11. If the problem or dispute was over, they were 
asked how it was resolved. The different forms of resolution can be categorised 
into those which may, on the face of it, reasonably be considered ‘restorative’ 
and those which may be considered ‘non-restorative’. If the respondent reports 
that they reached a compromise with their employer, this may be considered a 
restorative solution since it seemingly permits both parties to put the problem 
behind them and to continue their employment relationship as before. On the 
other hand, if the respondent reports that nothing changed or that they left their 
job, this may be considered a ‘non-restorative’ solution since the problem was 
not resolved in any meaningful way (see Table 1). It then follows from the 
argument put forward in the previous paragraph that the notion of ‘adverse 
treatment’ may be reserved for the subset of all individuals who have 
experienced problems or disputes which end in non-restorative resolutions (with 
                                            
10 Awareness of employment rights was measured on a 30-item scale, with the score for each 
individual determined by the number of employment rights that they managed to identify correctly. 
As one-third of respondents were not asked the block of questions on employment rights, they 
were assigned to the median score on this variable (24). 
11 Those reporting multiple problems in the past two years were asked to focus on “the most 
serious problem”. 
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those who experienced restorative solutions placed alongside those with no 
problems as not having experienced adverse treatment).  
The categorisation of outcomes into restorative and non-restorative solutions is 
very similar to that adopted by Fevre et al. (2009: 120), who distinguish between 
positive and negative forms of resolution. However, the categorisation in Table 1 
differs in two respects. In contrast to Fevre et al., the current schema takes “I 
moved jobs within the organisation” to be a ‘non-restorative’ outcome, as it 
implies that it was not possible for the prior employment relationship to be 
restored and thus to continue. Similarly, “Someone else resigned / was 
dismissed” is considered here to be a ‘restorative’ solution as it implies that the 
source of the problem was removed. 
Table 1: Restorative and non-restorative resolutions to problems or disputes 
Restorative resolutions Non-restorative resolutions 
My employer took action to address my 
problem / complaint 
I left my employer as a direct result 
My employer and I came to a compromise Nothing / just went on as before / forgot about 
it 
I took action to address my employer’s 
problem 
 
I moved jobs within the organisation 
Someone else resigned / was dismissed  
 
One difficulty with this approach, nevertheless, is that FTWS 2008 provides a 
window on the experiences of a random sample of individuals, some of whose 
problems or disputes are ongoing at the time of the survey interview. Specifically, 
39 per cent of employees who had experienced a problem at work in the past two 
years said that their most serious problem was ongoing. Given that the problem 
may have arisen any time in the two years prior to interview, it is possible that in 
some cases, the difficulty may have only arisen relatively recently and could be 
resolved at a later date. However, in other cases, the fact that the dispute is 
unresolved may indicate that it is more serious than average, as a resolution 
would then be more difficult to come by. It is therefore necessary to investigate 
the sensitivity of the results to differing assumptions about the proportion of these 
(as yet) unresolved disputes which are likely to be concluded in a restorative or 
non-restorative fashion.  
One approach is to assume that any unresolved disputes are a random sample 
of all disputes and to exclude them from the analysis. This approach, which 
seems reasonable in abstract, was the one adopted by Fevre et al. (2009: 118). 
However, an examination of the duration of resolved and unresolved disputes 
observed in the survey clearly indicates that those disputes which remained 
unresolved at the time of the survey interview had gone on considerably longer 
than the average (the median duration was 12 months, compared with a median 
duration of just three months among resolved disputes)12. Excluding the 
                                            
12 For those whose most serious problem was ongoing at some point within the two years before 
interview this was calculated as the number of months between the month and year that the most 
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unresolved cases thus risks introducing a bias into the estimation sample in 
favour of less serious (or more easily resolved) cases. Accordingly, the analysis 
is repeated under the assumption that all unresolved disputes will ultimately be 
resolved in a non-restorative manner and the sensitivity of the results to this 
alternative assumption are examined.  
3.3 Measures of power or dependence 
Measures are available within FTWS 2008 for many of the factors which are 
hypothesised to affect the balance of power or dependence between the 
employer and employee. Specifically, the survey interview collects a number of 
data items which describe the characteristics of the employee, their job and their 
employing organisation. In respect of the employee, this includes demographic 
characteristics as well as measures of their caring responsibilities and financial 
circumstances. In respect of the job, it includes indicators of the presence of a 
written employment contract, occupational status and the presence of supportive 
work colleagues, and in respect of the employer it includes measures of firm size, 
the presence of recognised unions and whether the employee considers that the 
employer discriminates in favour of certain demographic groups.  
In order to accurately identify the association between job and employer 
characteristics and unfair treatment, one requires information on the employment 
circumstances of the employee when the problem arose. As Fevre et al. note 
(2009: 118), a substantial minority of problems lead to a cessation of the 
employment relationship. FTWS 2008 addresses this issue for those who have 
not yet found a new job by asking them about their most recent employer and 
job. However, there remains a subset of employees who are in employment, but 
are no longer with the employer with whom they experienced the problem that is 
reported in the survey. In these cases, no information is provided on the 
characteristics of the job or employer that they left. Table 2 shows that 288 (25 
per cent) of those 1,150 respondents who reported some adverse treatment by 
an employer in the two years prior to the survey were working for a different 
employer at the time of interview. The characteristics of the job and employer 
which are relevant to the problems reported by these individuals are not collected 
in FTWS 2008. 
                                                                                                                                  
serious problem started and the month and year that the most serious problem ended 
(respondents were not asked to specify the day of the month). For those whose most serious 
problem in the past 2 years was ongoing or at an early stage, the duration was calculated as the 
number of months between the month and year that the most serious problem started and the 
month and year of the interview. 
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Table 2 : Whether adverse treatment occurred with current/recent or previous employer, 
by whether respondent is currently in employment 






No problems in 
past two years 
Total 
In employment 713 288 2,648 3,649 
Not in employment 105 44 202 351 
Total 818 332 2,850 4,000 
 
Fevre et al. (2009: 87) address this issue by restricting their analysis to those 
workers whose problems arose with their current employer (or if not currently 
employed, their most recent employer). However, there is a risk that this may 
exclude from the sample those problems which are most difficult to resolve, if 
employees who encounter the most serious difficulties have a higher probability 
of changing employer. The issue is addressed in this report by including 
respondents whose problem was only with a previous employer, thus allowing 
their individual characteristics to be incorporated into the multivariate analysis 
when estimating the probability of adverse treatment. The characteristics of the 
present job and employer are then used as proxies for those of the previous job 
and employer. In fact, the results of the analysis are largely invariant to the 
approach taken.  
Although the FTWS 2008 is comprehensive there are, nonetheless, some 
potentially important characteristics which are not observed in the survey. Some 
of these characteristics could be matched onto the dataset from external 
sources. Data were matched on from EUKLEMS at SIC(2007) Section-level to 
indicate average profitability in the industry sector (measured by the rate of return 
on capital employed in 2005) and to indicate whether the importance of labour 
inputs appeared to have risen or fallen in recent years (measured by the change 
in labour’s share of value-added over the period 1998-2007)13. Data were 
matched on from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey 2008 to indicate the likely 
threat of unionisation to non-union organisations (measured by the density of 
union membership among employees within the organisation’s SIC(2007) 
Section and Government Office Region). Finally, data were matched on from the 
Annual Population Survey 2008 to indicate the degree of monopsony power held 
by the employer in the external labour market (measured by the percentage of 
new hires in the employee’s SOC Minor Group that were recruited from non-
employment – see Manning (2003: 44-49)). 
Characteristics which could be expected to shape the likelihood that employees 
reported adverse treatment but which were not observed, even by proxy, 
comprised: the nature of the production regime in the organisation; the 
                                            
13 These observation points were the latest available in EUKLEMS at the time of writing. See 
www.euklems.net.  
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employer’s awareness of employment rights; the employee’s behavioural norms 
and expectations; and the personalities of individual employees and managers.  
3.3 Analytical methods 
The analysis begins in a descriptive manner by looking at the bivariate 
correlation between each of the factors observed from  (see page 8) and the 
probability of adverse treatment. In other words, the analysis first examines the 
simple incidence of adverse treatment among employees with different 
characteristics. This serves to indicate the broad patterns of adverse treatment 
for employees with particular characteristics, in specific types of job or working 
for particular types of employer.  
The descriptive analysis takes no account, however, of the inter-relationships 
between these various characteristics. It may be, for example, that employees in 
firms of a particular size are more likely to experience adverse treatment 
because the employees in such firms are less likely than the average employee 
to be given a written contract, with the latter characteristic being the more 
important determinant. Multivariate analysis is therefore conducted in order to 
take account of such inter-relationships and to identify the independent impact of 
each characteristic on the likelihood of adverse treatment.  
Both of the measures of adverse treatment that are utilised in the analysis are 
binary variables, taking the value of one when the respondent has reported 
adverse treatment and zero when they have not. The relationships between each 
measure of adverse treatment and the factors observed from  (page 8) are thus 
estimated using probit regression models (Long, 1997: 34-84). These probit 
regressions take the following form: 
Pr(adverse treatment = 1) = Φ (β0 + β1L + β2P + β3J + β4F + β5E) 
where: 
L is a vector of characteristics of the external labour market 
P is a vector of characteristics of the product market 
J is a vector of characteristics of the job 
F is a vector of characteristics of the firm (the employer) 
E is a vector of characteristics of the employee 
As the survey data is cross-sectional, it is important to be cautious about 
attributing causality in the associations found in the analysis. Furthermore, one 
must also be cautious about the possibility of reverse causality and seek to 
include within the regression analysis only those characteristics which are 
exogenous to (i.e. are not themselves determined by) the experience of adverse 
treatment. If reverse causality is present, it is likely to bias the estimated 
coefficients and so will not indicate the likely independent causal effect of the 
specified characteristics in determining the probability of adverse treatment. A 
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principal example is union membership, since it is likely that an employee who 
perceives ill treatment at the hands of their employer may seek to join a union as 
a means of protection. The potential role of unions in reducing the likelihood of 
adverse treatment is thus indicated instead by a measure of whether the 
employer recognises a trade union for pay bargaining, since union recognition 
tends to be a long-standing characteristic which rarely changes (Kersley et al., 
2006: 120-122). Job tenure is another example of a characteristic which is 
potentially endogenous, since adverse treatment on the part of an employer is 
likely to curtail the employment relationship in some cases. Age, occupation and 
academic qualifications are thus used as the preferred indicator of skills and 
abilities.  
It may be argued that the climate of employment relations within the organisation 
and the financial health of the employee’s household may also come within this 
category of variables liable to reverse causality. The arguments are not 
considered to be as strong as for union membership and job tenure, since a wide 
range of factors serve to determine the collective climate in a firm, and the 
financial health of an employee’s household is only likely to be adversely affected 
if the problem with their employer leads to unemployment. Consequently these 
indicators are retained in the analysis. However, the sensitivity of the results to 
their exclusion is reported in the text. 
The tables of results from the probit estimations, presented later in the report, 
indicate the estimated change in the probability of adverse treatment that arises 
from a one-unit change in the independent variable under consideration, when all 
other control variables are held at their mean values. In the case of categorical 
variables, it indicates the change in the probability of adverse treatment that 
arises from moving from the reference category to the category of interest. This 
is termed the ‘marginal effect’ of the characteristic on the probability of adverse 
treatment. Tables of results indicating the raw coefficients (the impact on the 
probit index) are available on request.  
As noted above, all estimates presented in this report have been produced using 
weighted data. The impact of the complex sample design in inflating standard 
errors is captured through the use of a linearized variance estimator. In the 
discussion we focus only on those associations which are statistically significant 
from zero at the five per cent level or better.  
 
4. Analysis and results 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
 
As noted in Section 3.2, the first indicator of adverse treatment employed in the 
analysis is a generalised measure of whether the employee perceived themselves to 
have been subject to problems with their ‘rights’ at work, unfair treatment, 
discrimination, harassment or bullying in the two years prior to the survey. Twenty 
nine per cent of those employed at some point in the two years prior to the survey 
interview were adversely treated according to this measure (Figure 3). Twenty four 
per cent reported a problem relating to their ‘rights’ at work, 13 per cent reported 
unfair treatment, seven per cent discrimination, one per cent sex-based harassment 
and seven per cent other forms of bullying and harassment. Accordingly, some 
reported adverse treatment along more than one dimension. 












Problem with employment rights
Any problem
Sou
rce:  Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008. 
*Weighted and based on 4,000 responses. 
 
The simple variations in perceptions of adverse treatment on this general measure 
are indicated in Table 3. It is apparent that a number of the hypotheses raised in 
Section 2.3 receive initial support in this bivariate analysis. For example, it is 
apparent that adverse treatment is more commonly experienced by those who would 
find it more difficult to find a similar or better job (i.e. those with limited options in the 
external labour market) than those who would find it easy. It is also more commonly 
experienced by those without a written contract of employment (44 per cent), those 
without colleagues with whom they can discuss work-related problems (52 per cent) 
and those who consider that their employer discriminates in favour of certain types of 
worker (58 per cent). Adverse treatment is also more common among younger 
workers, among those with long-standing health problems (44 per cent), those who 
are not heterosexual (46 per cent) and those with some/deep financial difficulties (56 
per cent). The incidence of these various characteristics within the population is 
indicated in Annex B.  
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Table 3: Incidence of perceived adverse treatment (general measure), by characteristics of the 
labour market, product market, employer, job and employee 







External labour market    
Ease of finding similar/better job:    
Not currently in work 0.431 0.030 351 
Fairly/very easy 0.252 0.012 1758 
Fairly difficult 0.290 0.016 1135 
Very difficult 0.369 0.022 615 
    
Product market    
Internal rate of return:    
Less than 1.9% 0.288 0.018 887 
1.9-5.0% 0.336 0.017 1000 
5.1-13.0% 0.275 0.016 1073 
13.0% or more 0.270 0.016 1018 
    
Change in labour's share of value-added:    
Increase of 4% or more 0.277 0.016 1035 
Increase of 0.6-2.3% 0.274 0.014 1349 
Increase of 0.1-0.5% 0.316 0.022 610 
Decrease 0.317 0.017 987 
    
Job characteristics    
No written contract of employment 0.436 0.025 495 
    
In temporary job 0.358 0.032 300 
    
Agency worker 0.322 0.052 113 
    
Occupation:    
Managerial, intermediate and own-account 0.273 0.010 2339 
Lower supervisory/technical/semi-routine 0.324 0.016 1097 
Routine 0.298 0.023 515 
    
Earnings in current/most recent job:    
Refused / Don’t know 0.196 0.024 341 
Earn less than £25,000 0.334 0.011 2388 
Earn £25,000 or more 0.237 0.013 1271 
    
Work less than 4 days a week 0.325 0.024 556 
    
No-one at work to discuss work-related problems with 0.524 0.029 385 
Table 3 continued on next page 
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Table 3 continued 







Employer/firm characteristics    
Family-owned/Charity 0.306 0.020 697 
    
Organisation size:    
Less than 10 employees 0.214 0.025 366 
10-49 employees 0.266 0.023 431 
50-249 employees 0.287 0.027 394 
250+ employees 0.308 0.011 2347 
Don't know 0.297 0.025 462 
    
Union threat:    
Union recognition 0.297 0.013 1538 
No recognition, industry union density 42% or more 0.306 0.027 394 
No recognition, union density 22-42% 0.286 0.021 594 
No recognition, union density 10-21% 0.291 0.021 661 
No recognition, union density less than 10% 0.278 0.020 677 
    
No HR department 0.305 0.018 943 
    
Relationship between managers and employees:   
Very good 0.190 0.011 1805 
Quite good 0.304 0.013 1710 
Not very good 0.627 0.030 353 
Not at all good 0.820 0.043 102 
    
Employer thought to prefer certain types of workers 0.583 0.035 246 
    
Employee characteristics    
Highest educational qualification:    
Higher degree or post-graduate 0.272 0.022 519 
Degree (undergraduate) 0.301 0.021 603 
Diplomas in higher education 0.285 0.024 497 
A-/AS-levels/SCE higher 0.345 0.021 697 
O-level/GCSE grades A-C 0.276 0.018 748 
O level/GCSE grades D-G 0.271 0.028 344 
Other 0.244 0.036 180 
None 0.282 0.026 396 
    
Number of days off sick in past year:    
5 or less 0.261 0.009 3217 
6-10 days 0.359 0.030 318 
11 days or more 0.499 0.029 389 
Table 3 continued on next page 
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 Table 3 continued 







    
Age:    
16-24 0.349 0.026 454 
25-32 0.301 0.019 683 
33-40 0.289 0.018 795 
41-49 0.285 0.016 917 
50 or more 0.259 0.015 1151 
    
Not asked questions on awareness of employment 
rights 0.280 0.014 1340 
    
Would go to Acas for information on rights at work 0.221 0.022 514 
Not asked questions on places would seek advice on 
rights 0.303 0.014 1384 
    
Not competent in spoken English 0.308 0.051 119 
    
Female 0.321 0.012 2051 
    
Black or Asian (ref. White or mixed race) 0.262 0.028 340 
    
Long-standing health problem 0.443 0.025 505 
    
Not heterosexual 0.459 0.070 70 
    
Non-migrant 0.296 0.009 3512 
EU migrant 0.268 0.043 137 
Non-EU migrant 0.264 0.027 341 
    
Financial position:    
Manage very/quite well 0.247 0.011 2283 
Get by alright 0.322 0.014 1358 
Don't manage very well 0.486 0.047 145 
Have some/deep financial difficulties 0.563 0.040 184 
    
Not living with someone as a couple 0.325 0.014 1527 
    
Dependent children under 18 in household 0.299 0.013 1595 
    
Cares for ill or disabled family or friends 0.400 0.025 520 
    
Don't have someone close to talk about personal things 0.357 0.042 165 
Table 3 continued on next page 
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Table 3 continued 







    
Personal relationship    
Related to manager or employer 0.271 0.042 160 
     
Source: Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
* Weighted responses. Awareness of employment rights was measured on a 30-item scale and 
so it is omitted from this table. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2, the second indicator of adverse treatment focuses on 
those whose most serious problem in the last two years was not resolved in a 
‘restorative’ manner. Thirty nine per cent of cases of adverse treatment were 
considered to be ongoing (see Figure 4). If those individuals who reported an 
ongoing problem (12 per cent of all individuals covered by the survey) are excluded, 
then 7 per cent of individuals experienced a problem with a non-restorative solution. 
If ongoing problems are assumed to end non-restoratively, the figure increases to 18 
per cent (see Table 4). 
Figure 4: Status of dispute at time of interview by nature of most serious problem (in two years 
before interview) 





























Discrimination Bullying Sexual 
harassment
Still ongoing Too early to say Most likely now over Now over
 
Source:  Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
Weighted and based on 4,010 observations. 
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Table 4: Outcome from most serious problem in past 2 years 
 Restorative Non-restorative Ongoing 













Source: Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
*Weighted and based on 3,782 responses 
 
Table 5 indicates how the prevalence of adverse treatment varies on these two 
alternative measures. The first set of columns show the incidence of ‘problems with 
non-restorative outcomes’ when individuals with ongoing problems have been 
excluded from the base (with the overall incidence of adverse treatment then 
standing at 0.07, i.e. 7 per cent). The second set of columns show the incidence if 
these ongoing problems are assumed to reach non-restorative conclusions (when the 
overall incidence is then 0.18, i.e. 18 per cent). A number of the factors highlighted 
from Table 3 are shown to be relevant here also. Non-restorative solutions are thus 
more common among those with fewer alternative options in the external labour 
market, those without a written contract of employment, those without social support 
in the workplace, those with discriminating employers, young workers, those with 
long-standing health conditions and those who are not heterosexual.  
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Table 5: Incidence of adverse treatment with non-restorative outcomes, by characteristics of 










error N Mean 
Standard 
error N 
External labour market       
Ease of finding similar/better job:     
Not currently in work 0.222 0.028 305 0.308 0.029 340 
Fairly/very easy 
0.056 0.007 1552 0.143 0.010 1713 
Fairly difficult 0.061 0.009 982 0.183 0.013 1116 
Very difficult 0.090 0.015 491 0.246 0.020 602 
       
Product market      
Internal rate of return:      
Less than 1.9% 0.101 0.012 774 0.208 0.016 872 
1.9-5.0% 0.070 0.010 842 0.201 0.014 977 
5.1-13.0% 0.066 0.009 935 0.159 0.013 1042 
13.0% or more 0.065 0.010 891 0.162 0.013 997 
       
Change in labour's share of value-added:    
Increase of 4% or more 0.100 0.012 897 0.193 0.014 1010 
Increase of 0.6-2.3% 0.065 0.008 1181 0.164 0.012 1317 
Increase of 0.1-0.5% 0.052 0.011 520 0.188 0.018 599 
Decrease 0.074 0.010 846 0.188 0.014 965 
       
Job characteristics      
No written contract of 
employment 0.169 0.022 393 0.324 0.024 481 
       
In temporary job 0.117 0.022 261 0.198 0.025 291 
       
Agency worker 0.082 0.027 100 0.137 0.033 109 
       
Occupation:      
Managerial, intermediate and 
own-account 0.064 0.006 2057 0.159 0.009 2291 
Lower 
supervisory/technical/semi-
routine 0.085 0.010 923 0.214 0.014 1071 
Routine 0.101 0.016 441 0.206 0.021 502 














error N Mean 
Standard 
error N 
Earnings in current/most recent 
job:       
Refused / Don’t know 0.043 0.013 308 0.115 0.019 334 
Earn less than £25,000 0.094 0.007 2023 0.216 0.010 2329 
Earn £25,000 or more 0.047 0.007 1129 0.132 0.011 1245 
       
Work less than 4 days a week 0.088 0.015 476 0.197 0.020 544 
       
No-one at work to discuss work-
related problems with 0.203 0.029 276 0.404 0.029 375 
       
Employer/firm characteristics     
Family-owned/Charity 0.093 0.014 599 0.203 0.018 681 
       
Organisation size:      
Less than 10 employees 0.098 0.018 334 0.177 0.024 363 
10-49 employees 0.086 0.017 379 0.171 0.021 420 
50-249 employees 0.060 0.015 338 0.164 0.021 385 
250+ employees 0.071 0.006 2012 0.186 0.009 2294 
Don't know 0.074 0.015 397 0.183 0.021 446 
       
Union threat:      
Union recognition 0.052 0.007 1314 0.174 0.011 1504 
No recognition, industry union 
density 42% or more 0.089 0.017 333 0.220 0.024 383 
No recognition, union density 22-
42% 0.093 0.016 523 0.179 0.019 581 
No recognition, union density 10-
21% 0.097 0.014 578 0.187 0.017 647 
No recognition, union density 
less than 10% 0.072 0.012 596 0.162 0.016 660 
       
No HR department 0.109 0.013 800 0.216 0.016 917 
       
Relationship between managers and employees:   
Very good 0.057 0.007 1696 0.097 0.008 1768 
Quite good 0.065 0.007 1458 0.184 0.011 1676 
Not very good 0.186 0.028 223 0.486 0.032 340 
Not at all good 0.454 0.074 60 0.667 0.053 96 
       
Employer thought to prefer 
certain types of workers 0.198 0.036 175 0.433 0.037 240 














error N Mean 
Standard 
error N 
       
Employee characteristics     
Highest educational qualification:     
Higher degree or post-graduate 0.069 0.013 463 0.149 0.017 508 
Degree (undergraduate) 0.065 0.012 520 0.178 0.017 594 
Diplomas in higher education 0.059 0.014 424 0.175 0.020 481 
A-/AS-levels/SCE higher 0.093 0.014 585 0.213 0.018 677 
O-level/GCSE grades A-C 0.071 0.011 647 0.172 0.016 732 
O level/GCSE grades D-G 0.077 0.017 301 0.172 0.023 338 
Other 0.066 0.026 161 0.179 0.035 178 
None 0.089 0.016 346 0.196 0.025 384 
       
Number of days off sick in past year:    
5 or less 0.070 0.006 2838 0.163 0.007 3153 
6-10 days 0.096 0.020 264 0.228 0.026 313 
11 days or more 0.107 0.021 292 0.303 0.027 371 
       
Age:       
16-24 0.119 0.018 393 0.214 0.022 439 
25-32 0.078 0.012 585 0.179 0.016 664 
33-40 0.076 0.011 691 0.172 0.014 774 
41-49 0.067 0.010 782 0.187 0.014 896 
50 or more 0.052 0.008 1009 0.164 0.013 1135 
       
Not asked questions on 
awareness of employment rights 0.071 0.008 1176 0.168 0.012 1317 
       
Would go to Acas for information 
on rights at work 0.052 0.012 470 0.127 0.017 509 
Not asked questions on places 
would seek advice on rights 0.069 0.008 1179 0.194 0.012 1352 
       
Not competent in spoken English 0.078 0.027 104 0.187 0.042 117 
       
Female 0.093 0.008 1771 0.202 0.010 2008 
       
Black or Asian (ref. White or 
mixed race) 0.062 0.016 302 0.155 0.022 333 
       
Long-standing health problem 0.133 0.019 389 0.304 0.023 491 
       
Not heterosexual 0.121 0.044 56 0.282 0.061 68 















error N Mean 
Standard 
error N 
Non-migrant 0.077 0.006 3031 0.183 0.008 3430 
EU migrant 0.059 0.019 120 0.172 0.037 134 
Non-EU migrant 0.054 0.014 300 0.160 0.023 334 
       
Financial position:      
Manage very/quite well 0.045 0.005 2038 0.131 0.008 2231 
Get by alright 0.099 0.010 1159 0.212 0.013 1329 
Don't manage very well 0.203 0.043 110 0.391 0.047 140 
Have some/deep financial 
difficulties 0.262 0.045 126 0.472 0.041 179 
       
Not living with someone as a 
couple 0.093 0.010 1299 0.198 0.012 1486 
       
Dependent children under 18 in 
household 0.076 0.008 1377 0.184 0.011 1557 
       
Cares for ill or disabled family or 
friends 0.077 0.014 426 0.231 0.021 505 
       
Don't have someone close to 
talk about personal things 0.093 0.032 132 0.245 0.039 162 
       
Personal relationship     
Related to manager or employer 0.131 0.035 145 0.193 0.038 155 
     
Source: Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
* Weighted responses. Awareness of employment rights was measured on a 30-item scale and 
so it is omitted from this table. 
4.2 Multivariate analysis of problems at work 
The various factors included in the preceding tables were entered into multivariate 
analyses in order to identify the independent impact of each characteristic on the 
likelihood of adverse treatment. Table 6 shows the results from the multivariate 
analysis of the more generalised measure of perceived adverse treatment, as 
previously introduced in Table 3. As noted in Section 3.3, the table presents marginal 
effects. In the case of continuous variables, the marginal effect indicates the 
estimated change in the probability of adverse treatment that arises from a one-unit 
change in the variable when all other variables are held at their mean values. In the 
case of categorical variables, it indicates the effect of moving from the reference 
category to the category of interest.  
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Table 6: Marginal effects of various characteristics on the probability of adverse treatment 
(general measure) 







External labour market     
Ease of finding similar or better job (ref. 
fairly/very easy):     
Not currently in work 0.049 0.030 1.64 0.107 
Fairly difficult 0.037 0.019 1.88 0.065 
Very difficult 0.078 0.024 3.29 0.002 
     
Product market     
Internal rate of return -0.103 0.076 -1.35 0.183 
     
Change in labour's share of value-
added (ref. Increase of 4% or more):   
Increase of 0.6-2.3% 0.051 0.024 2.08 0.041 
Increase of 0.1-0.5% 0.086 0.030 2.89 0.005 
Decrease 0.108 0.027 3.98 0.000 
     
Job characteristics     
No written contract of employment 0.140 0.026 5.30 0.000 
     
In temporary job 0.015 0.033 0.44 0.663 
     
Agency worker -0.018 0.055 -0.33 0.739 
     
Occupation (ref. Managerial, intermediate and own-account): 
Lower supervisory/technical/semi-
routine 0.022 0.022 1.00 0.323 
Routine 0.023 0.030 0.77 0.442 
     
Earnings in current / most recent job 
(ref. £25,000 or more):     
Refused / Don’t know 0.003 0.037 0.09 0.929 
Earn less than £25,000 0.051 0.021 2.42 0.019 
     
Work less than 4 days a week 0.027 0.025 1.07 0.288 
     
No-one at work to discuss work-related 
problems with 0.134 0.029 4.63 0.000 
     
Employer/firm characteristics     
Family-owned/Charity 0.053 0.025 2.16 0.035 




Table 6 continued 







     
Organisation size (ref. 250+ 
employees):     
Less than 10 employees -0.120 0.039 -3.06 0.003 
10-49 employees -0.082 0.031 -2.69 0.009 
50-249 employees -0.010 0.028 -0.34 0.735 
Don't know -0.046 0.030 -1.49 0.140 
     
Union threat (ref. Union recognition):     
No recognition, industry union density 
42% or more -0.078 0.030 -2.60 0.012 
No recognition, union density 22-42% -0.020 0.027 -0.73 0.469 
No recognition, union density 10-21% 0.026 0.027 0.94 0.349 
No recognition, union density less than 
10% 0.007 0.027 0.28 0.781 
     
No HR department 0.000 0.025 -0.01 0.996 
  
Relationship between managers and 
employees (ref. Very good):  
Quite good 0.094 0.017 5.52 0.000 
Not very good 0.284 0.030 9.52 0.000 
Not at all good 0.421 0.056 7.58 0.000 
     
Employer thought to prefer certain types 
of workers 0.165 0.033 5.05 0.000 
     
Employee characteristics     
Highest educational qualification (ref. None): 
Higher degree or post-graduate 0.039 0.042 0.93 0.356 
Degree (undergraduate) 0.054 0.039 1.39 0.170 
Diplomas in higher education 0.022 0.038 0.57 0.574 
A-/AS-levels/SCE higher 0.044 0.036 1.22 0.228 
O-level/GCSE grades A-C -0.024 0.036 -0.67 0.506 
O level/GCSE grades D-G -0.066 0.040 -1.66 0.102 
Other 0.024 0.049 0.50 0.621 
     
Number of days off sick in past year (ref. 5 or less): 
6-10 days 0.032 0.027 1.17 0.247 
11 days or more 0.153 0.025 6.10 0.000 




Table 6 continued  







     
Age (ref. 50 and over):     
16-24 0.150 0.032 4.68 0.000 
25-32 0.095 0.026 3.60 0.001 
33-40 0.073 0.026 2.77 0.007 
41-49 0.037 0.025 1.49 0.141 
     
Awareness of employment rights 0.004 0.003 1.21 0.230 
Not asked questions on awareness of 
employment rights -0.026 0.020 -1.30 0.197 
     
Would go to Acas for information on 
rights at work -0.062 0.027 -2.34 0.023 
Not asked questions on places would 
seek advice on rights -0.013 0.020 -0.67 0.506 
     
Not competent in spoken English -0.057 0.062 -0.92 0.361 
     
Female 0.027 0.018 1.49 0.141 
     
Black or Asian (ref. White or mixed 
race) -0.082 0.040 -2.04 0.046 
     
Long-standing health problem 0.066 0.025 2.67 0.010 
     
Not heterosexual 0.096 0.058 1.65 0.104 
     
Whether migrant (ref. Non-migrant):     
EU migrant -0.073 0.050 -1.46 0.149 
Non-EU migrant -0.011 0.039 -0.29 0.776 
     
Financial position (ref. Manage very/quite well): 
Get by alright 0.035 0.018 1.97 0.054 
Don't manage very well 0.062 0.046 1.35 0.183 
Have some/deep financial difficulties 0.138 0.042 3.27 0.002 
     
Not living with someone as a couple 0.016 0.018 0.89 0.379 
     
Dependent children under 18 in 
household 0.021 0.019 1.10 0.277 
     
Cares for ill or disabled family or friends 0.073 0.023 3.16 0.002 




Table 6 continued  







     
Don't have someone close to talk about 
personal things -0.025 0.042 -0.60 0.549 
     
Personal relationship     
Related to manager or employer -0.027 0.042 -0.65 0.549 
     
Source: Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
*F=8.04; Weighted and based on 3,250 responses. 
 
Considering first the influence of the external labour market, it is clear that those 
individuals with fewer outside options remain more likely to experience adverse 
treatment after controlling for all other observed factors. When compared with those 
who report that it would be ‘fairly easy’ or ‘very easy’ to find a similar or better job, 
those who report that it would be ‘very difficult’ are 7.8 percentage points more likely 
to report adverse treatment. The other potential indicator of the state of the external 
labour market mentioned in Section 3.2, namely the fraction of employees in the 
SOC group hired from non-employment, was not statistically significant and so was 
dropped from the final specification. It seems likely that the indicator arising from the 
survey itself was sufficient to identify employers’ monopsony power.  
Turning to the influence of the product market, the indicator of the sectoral rate of 
profitability – used as a proxy for product market power – was negatively signed, in 
line with the hypothesis outlined in Section 2.3. However, the coefficient was not 
precisely estimated and so was not significantly different from zero. The change in 
labour’s share of value-added, on the other hand, did show a statistically significant 
association with the probability of adverse treatment. In line with expectations, 
individuals working in sectors where labour had been squeezed were more likely to 
experience adverse treatment than those working in sectors where labour had 
prospered. Those individuals working in sectors where labour’s share of value added 
had declined over the period 1998-2007 (e.g. Mining and quarrying; Electricity, gas 
and water supply; and Financial intermediation) were 10.8 percentage points more 
likely to have experienced adverse treatment than those individuals working in 
sectors where labour’s share had risen by 4 percentage points or more (e.g. 
Manufacturing; and Other community, social and personal services).  
Some job characteristics were also found to be independently related to the 
probability of adverse treatment. The absence of a written contract of employment 
raised the probability of adverse treatment by 14.0 percentage points, whilst the 
absence of a social support structure among work colleagues raised it by 13.4 
percentage points. The probability of adverse treatment was 5.1 percentage points 
higher among those earning less than £25,000 than it was among higher paid 
workers, although this association may arguably reflect productivity differentials 
(strictly an employee characteristic, rather than a job characteristic). Having a 
temporary contract, being in a routine or semi-routine occupation and working fewer 
than four days per week were each positively associated with the probability of 
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adverse treatment but the magnitude of the estimated effects was too small to render 
them statistically significant. 
The set of employer/firm characteristics provided further determinants of adverse 
treatment. Individuals working for family-owned firms or charities were 5.3 
percentage points more likely to experience adverse treatment than those working for 
private companies or the public sector, even after controlling for product market 
characteristics and organisation size. The relationship between organisation size and 
adverse treatment was particularly notable since, in contradiction to many 
stereotypes, adverse treatment was least likely in micro and small firms. Employees 
in firms with fewer than 10 employees were 12.0 percentage points less likely to 
report adverse treatment than employees in large firms (those with 250 or more 
employees), whilst employees in firms with 10-49 employees were 8.2 percentage 
points less likely to do so. Whilst this may reflect the less codified nature of 
employment in small firms (see Section 2.3 for a discussion), it is also notable that 
the pattern accords with that seen in respect of a broader set of perceptions of job 
quality, observed in WERS 2004 (Forth et al., 2006).  
Union status also provides considerable interest since employees working in 
organisations which recognise trade unions are no less likely to be adversely treated 
than employees working in non-union organisations, after controlling for other factors. 
In contrast, adverse treatment is least likely in those non-union organisations that are 
operating in sectors and regions where unionisation is relatively common. It can be 
surmised that the union threat may be working to dissuade such employers from 
treating their employees adversely, in case such treatment should stimulate an 
organising campaign.  
The presence of an HR department is not found to affect the probability of adverse 
treatment. However, if the respondent considered that their employer preferred 
certain types of worker (with such a non-meritocratic approach arguably being more 
likely in the absence of a specialist HR function), then the likelihood of adverse 
treatment was increased. Working for a ‘discriminating’ employer raised the 
probability of adverse treatment by 16.5 percentage points on average. The effect 
remained even after those whose reported problem related specifically to perceived 
discrimination were removed from the analysis. It would seem, therefore, that 
employers who favour certain groups are more likely to treat employees adversely in 
other ways as well.  
Finally in the section of employer characteristics, the likelihood of adverse treatment 
was found to be very strongly associated with the general climate of employment 
relations at the establishment. When compared with individuals working in 
organisations where the climate was considered (by the respondent) to be ‘very 
good’, those in organisations where the climate was considered only ‘quite good’ 
were 9.4 percentage points more likely to report adverse treatment. The few in 
organisations where the climate was ‘not very good’ were 28.4 per cent more likely to 
report adverse treatment, whilst the small minority in organisations where the climate 
was ‘not at all good’ were 42.1 per cent more likely. These are very large effects 
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indeed. However, only around one in ten employees worked in organisations where 
the climate was considered either ‘not very good’ or ‘not at all good’14.  
The final set of characteristics concerns the employee themselves. Their academic 
qualifications were not found to be associated with the probability of adverse 
treatment. This perhaps indicates that employee productivity was picked up 
elsewhere in the model. 
Health and age are two factors which may be related to productivity (among other 
things), and both showed statistically significant associations with the probability of 
adverse treatment. Employees who had recorded 11 days or more of sick leave in 
the year prior to the interview were 15.3 percentage points more likely to report 
adverse treatment by their employer than employees who had recorded 5 days or 
less. Younger workers were also more likely to report adverse treatment than older 
workers. A worker aged 16-24 years old was 15.0 percentage points more likely to 
report adverse treatment than a worker aged 50 or over.  
The employee’s level of awareness of specific employment rights was, surprisingly, 
not found to reduce the probability of adverse treatment. However those who 
mentioned Acas when asked to list bodies which they might go to for information on 
rights at work were 6.2 percentage points less likely to report adverse treatment than 
those who did not mention this organisation15. This suggests that an awareness of 
where to obtain information on employment rights – and awareness of Acas in 
particular – can help to protect against adverse treatment. A similar variable 
indicating awareness of Citizens Advice Bureaux was not statistically significant.  
Language ability was not a statistically significant predictor of adverse treatment; nor 
was an indicator of whether the employee was a migrant. However, those factors 
which are typically associated with disadvantage among migrants in the labour 
market, such as low skills, low wages and the absence of written contracts were 
controlled for elsewhere16. Some other demographic characteristics were related to 
the probability of adverse treatment, however, with individuals that had a long-
standing health problem or disability 6.6 percentage points more likely to report 
adverse treatment than those without, and gay/lesbian/bisexual workers 9.6 
percentage points more likely to report adverse treatment than non-heterosexuals, 
after controlling for other factors. Gender, in contrast, was not independently 
associated with the probability of adverse treatment, whilst members of Black or 
Asian ethnic minority groups were actually less likely to report adverse treatment 
than members of White or Mixed Race groups.  
Among the remaining employee characteristics, the financial position of the 
employee’s household and the presence of caring responsibilities were both found to 
be associated with the probability of adverse treatment. Following the hypotheses set 
                                            
14 The sensitivity of the other estimated effects in the model to the inclusion of the climate variable was 
tested, in view of concerns about its potential endogeneity (see Section 3.3). However, the other 
effects were found to be largely unaffected.  
15 Respondents were not prompted with possible sources of advice. 
16 The survey did not seek to determine whether they were legally resident or permitted to work. 
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out in Section 2.3, employees who were struggling to manage financially were more 
likely to be vulnerable to adverse treatment than those who were managing well, 
whilst those who cared for an ill or disabled family-member or friend were more likely 
to be vulnerable to adverse treatment than those without such responsibilities. These 
factors thus indicate clearly that factors external to the job may affect an employee’s 
vulnerability to adverse treatment within employment.  
Finally, it can be noted that the multivariate analysis reported here has included a 
number of characteristics that were not included in the comparable analysis of 
perceived adverse treatment reported by Fevre et al. (2009: Table B7.3). A number 
of these have proved to be statistically significant determinants of adverse treatment 
and this is reflected in the improved fit of the model when compared with Fevre et 
al.’s specification. A pseudo-R2 of 0.33 is obtained from the specification presented in 
Table 6, compared with a pseudo-R2 of 0.13 under Fevre et al.’s specification17.  
Whilst pseudo-R2  values cannot be interpreted in a meaningful way in isolation, they 
are a valid way of comparing models predicting the same outcome using the same 
dataset. To complement these general indicators, Table 7 provides a comparison of 
predicted and actual outcomes using Fevre et al.’s specification, which can be 
examined alongside Table 8, which shows predicated and actual outcomes for the 
specification shown in Table 6. The comparison indicates that the Fevre et al. 
specification was less successful in correctly predicting whether respondents 
experienced a problem than was the specification presented in this report (the former 
correctly predicted 13 per cent of cases of adverse treatment whilst the latter 
correctly predicted 39 per cent). Consequently, overall the Fevre et al. model 
predicted a lower proportion of outcomes correctly than the model presented in Table 
6 (73 per cent, compared with 78 per cent).  
                                            
17 The pseudo-R2 are obtained using McEvley and Zavoina’s approach. Although the analysis reported 
by Fevre et al in Table B7.3 focuses on the experience of problems in any of the five years preceding 
the survey, we conduct an otherwise equivalent analysis on the experience of problems in the two 
years preceding the survey so as to ensure strict comparability with the dependent variable reported in 
Table 6.  
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Table 7: Any problem in 2 years before interview, classification table based on the model used 
in Table B7.3 of Fevre et al. 2009 
 Predicted   
Observed No Yes Total Correct (row %) 
No 2,075 89 2164 95.9 
Yes 735 108 843 12.8 
Total 2810 197 3007  
     
Total correct (%)    72.6 
Pseudo R2    0.130 
     
Source: Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
*Weighted and based on 3,007 responses 
 
 
Table 8: Any problem in 2 years before interview, classification table based on the model used 
in Table 6 
 Predicted   
Observed No Yes Total Correct (row %) 
No 2,011 153 2164 92.9 
Yes 517 326 843 38.7 
Total 2528 479 3007  
     
Total correct (%)    77.7 
Pseudo R2    0.331 
     
Source: Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
*Weighted and based on 3,007 responses 
 
4.3 Multivariate analysis of problems with non-restorative outcomes 
The multivariate analysis was repeated for the two alternative indicators of non-
restorative outcomes: that from which those with ongoing problems were excluded; 
and that in which all ongoing problems were assumed to lead to non-restorative 
outcomes. The results are presented in Table 9 and Table 12 respectively.  
The process of refining the model specification identified no additional covariates that 
were significantly related to the probability of adverse treatment on these measures, 
other than those which are reported in Table 6. Consequently, the models reported in 
Table 9 and Table 12 were estimated with this same set of covariates. It can 
immediately be noted, however, that fewer of the covariates are statistically 
significant in these models. Those which are statistically significant in Table 9 and 
Table 12 are typically those which exhibited the strongest associations with the 
probability of adverse treatment in Table 6.  
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Focusing first on Table 9, one finds that neither the external labour market nor the 
product market appear to have an influence on the incidence of problems with non-
restorative outcomes. The first characteristic found to be associated with such 
problems is the absence of a written contract of employment. Employees without a 
written contract were 3.5 percentage points more likely to report a problem which 
ended in a non-restorative solution. The second job characteristic associated with 
non-restorative outcomes was the absence of social support within the workplace. 
Employees without a social support structure at work were 3.4 percentage points 
more likely to report a problem which ended in a non-restorative solution.  
Turning to employer characteristics, the climate of employment relations was found 
to be an important predictor of outcomes, as it had been of the more general 
measure of adverse treatment. The minority of employees in organisations where the 
climate was either ‘not very good’ or ‘not at all good’ were at least 5 percentage 
points more likely to report a non-restorative outcome than employees in 
organisations with more favourable climates. Those employees in organisations 
where the employer was considered to discriminate in favour of certain groups were 
5.7 percentage points more likely to report problems with non-restorative outcomes 
than other workers.  
In terms of employee characteristics, younger workers and those with long-standing 
health problems were more likely to report problems with non-restorative outcomes 
than were their comparators. Finally, in keeping with the analysis of the more general 
measure of adverse treatment, employees with financial difficulties were more likely 
to report problems with non-restorative outcomes than were employees whose 
households were in better financial health. Those employees in households with 
some/deep financial difficulties were 7.3 percentage points more likely to report such 
problems than were employees who considered that they were managing quite well 
or very well.  
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Table 9: Marginal effect of various characteristics on likelihood of having experienced a non-
restorative outcome in the 2 years before interview 
Non-restorative outcome from most 






External labour market     
Ease of finding similar or better job 
(ref. fairly/very easy):     
Not currently in work 0.051 0.016 3.25 0.002 
Fairly difficult 0.015 0.011 1.35 0.181 
Very difficult 0.022 0.015 1.48 0.143 
     
Product market     
Internal rate of return -0.068 0.044 -1.56 0.123 
     
Change in labour's share of value-
added (ref. Increase of 4% or more):   
Increase of 0.6-2.3% -0.026 0.014 -1.82 0.074 
Increase of 0.1-0.5% -0.028 0.018 -1.58 0.118 
Decrease -0.001 0.017 -0.04 0.971 
     
Job characteristics     
No written contract of employment 0.035 0.014 2.52 0.014 
     
In temporary job 0.001 0.020 0.07 0.943 
     
Agency worker -0.011 0.030 -0.36 0.723 
     
Occupation (ref. Managerial, 
intermediate and own-account):   
Lower supervisory/technical/semi-
routine -0.013 0.013 -1.05 0.300 
Routine 0.005 0.016 0.31 0.761 
     
Earnings in current / most recent job 
(ref. £25,000 or more):     
Refused / Don’t know 0.009 0.021 0.40 0.689 
Earn less than £25,000 0.010 0.013 0.78 0.437 
     
Work less than 4 days a week -0.001 0.015 -0.05 0.963 
     
No-one at work to discuss work-related 
problems with 0.034 0.016 2.04 0.045 




Table 9 continued  
Non-restorative outcome from most 






     
Employer/firm characteristics     
Family-owned/Charity 0.006 0.014 0.41 0.685 
     
Organisation size (ref. 250+ 
employees):     
Less than 10 employees -0.017 0.020 -0.88 0.383 
10-49 employees -0.007 0.017 -0.41 0.681 
50-249 employees -0.031 0.019 -1.64 0.105 
Don't know -0.033 0.019 -1.76 0.084 
     
Union threat (ref. Union recognition):     
No recognition, industry union density 
42% or more 0.001 0.019 0.05 0.961 
No recognition, union density 22-42% 0.012 0.015 0.77 0.444 
No recognition, union density 10-21% 0.015 0.016 0.96 0.343 
No recognition, union density less than 
10% 0.014 0.014 0.95 0.346 
     
No HR department 0.009 0.014 0.63 0.529 
     
Relationship between managers and 
employees (ref. Very good):  
Quite good 0.014 0.010 1.36 0.180 
Not very good 0.053 0.015 3.42 0.001 
Not at all good 0.134 0.027 4.97 0.000 
     
Employer thought to prefer certain 
types of workers 0.057 0.018 3.13 0.003 
     
Employee characteristics     
Highest educational qualification (ref. 
None):    
Higher degree or post-graduate 0.022 0.023 0.96 0.340 
Degree (undergraduate) -0.002 0.021 -0.07 0.942 
Diplomas in higher education 0.005 0.022 0.23 0.815 
A-/AS-levels/SCE higher 0.001 0.020 0.06 0.951 
O-level/GCSE grades A-C -0.011 0.020 -0.55 0.583 
O level/GCSE grades D-G -0.020 0.022 -0.89 0.378 
Other -0.021 0.029 -0.74 0.462 




Table 9 continued  
Non-restorative outcome from most 






     
Number of days off sick in past year 
(ref. 5 or less):    
6-10 days 0.002 0.016 0.11 0.910 
11 days or more 0.018 0.017 1.09 0.282 
     
Age (ref. 50 and over):     
16-24 0.067 0.017 3.87 0.000 
25-32 0.036 0.016 2.19 0.032 
33-40 0.028 0.017 1.70 0.095 
41-49 0.017 0.016 1.03 0.305 
     
Awareness of employment rights 0.000 0.002 0.02 0.982 
Not asked questions on awareness of 
employment rights -0.011 0.011 -1.01 0.317 
     
Would go to Acas for information on 
rights at work -0.012 0.016 -0.76 0.452 
Not asked questions on places would 
seek advice on rights -0.018 0.012 -1.49 0.142 
     
Not competent in spoken English -0.100 0.052 -1.92 0.059 
     
Female 0.020 0.011 1.82 0.073 
     
Black or Asian (ref. White or mixed 
race) 0.000 0.022 0.00 0.998 
     
Long-standing health problem 0.035 0.015 2.35 0.022 
     
Not heterosexual 0.044 0.031 1.39 0.169 
     
Whether migrant (ref. Non-migrant):     
EU migrant -0.063 0.037 -1.72 0.090 
Non-EU migrant -0.033 0.023 -1.48 0.143 
     
Financial position (ref. Manage 
very/quite well):    
Get by alright 0.032 0.010 3.08 0.003 
Don't manage very well 0.042 0.025 1.69 0.095 
Have some/deep financial difficulties 0.073 0.022 3.41 0.001 
     
Not living with someone as a couple -0.009 0.012 -0.73 0.467 
Table 9 continued on next page 
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Table 9 continued  
Non-restorative outcome from most 






     
Dependent children under 18 in 
household 0.000 0.013 0.03 0.976 
     
Cares for ill or disabled family or 
friends -0.010 0.015 -0.67 0.503 
     
Don't have someone close to talk 
about personal things -0.020 0.035 -0.57 0.573 
     
Personal relationship     
Related to manager or employer 0.024 0.022 1.11 0.272 
     
Source: Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
*F=3.77; Weighted and based on 2,821 responses. 
 
Table 10 and Table 11 show that the pseudo R2 from the Fevre et al. model 
specification for non-restorative outcomes was slightly higher than that obtained from 
the model presented in Table 9. However, the model used in this report did manage 
to predict the proportion of respondents who experienced a non-restorative outcomes 
slightly more accurately, so that overall the proportion of predictions which proved to 
be correct was the same as the model used in Fevre et al. A comparison with Tables 
7 and 8 confirms that the occurrence of problems with non-restorative solutions (or 
negative resolutions in the language of Fevre et al.) was more difficult to predict than 
the occurrence of problems more generally.  
Table 10: Non-restorative outcome in the 2 years before interview, classification table based on 
the model used in Table B10.3 of Fevre et al. 2009 
 Predicted   
Observed No Yes Total Correct (row %) 
No 2,419 8 2,427 99.7 
Yes 149 17 166 10.2 
Total 2,568 25 2,593  
     
Total correct (%)    93.9 
Pseudo R2    0.278 
     
Source: Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
*Weighted and based on 2,593 responses 
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Table 11: Non-restorative outcome in the 2 years before interview, classification table based 
on the model used in Table 12 
 Predicted   
Observed No Yes Total Correct (row %) 
No 2,417 10 2,427 99.6 
Yes 147 19 166 11.4 
Total 2,564 29 2,593  
     
Total correct (%)    93.9 
Pseudo R2    0.260 
     
Source: Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
*Weighted and based on 2,593 responses 
 
In Table 12, where all ongoing problems are assumed to end in non-restorative 
outcomes, the broad pattern is similar to that seen in Table 9. However, those 
marginal effects which are statistically significant from zero in both tables are typically 
larger in Table 12 than they are in Table 9. For instance, in Table 12, employees 
without a written contract are 9.8 percentage points more likely to report a problem 
with a non-restorative outcome (the equivalent marginal effect in Table 9 was 3.5 
percentage points).  
Some additional factors which were not significantly associated with the incidence of 
problems with non-restorative solutions in Table 9 also appear statistically significant 
from zero in Table 12. The influence of the external labour market is apparent for 
example, whereby employees who report that it would be ‘very difficult’ to find a 
similar or better job are 5.7 percentage points more likely to report a problem with a 
non-restorative outcome than otherwise similar employees who would find it ‘fairly 
easy’ or ‘very easy’. Low earnings, high levels of sickness absence and not being 
heterosexual are also positively associated with such outcomes under the 
specification reported in Table 12. 
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Table 12: Marginal effect of various characteristics on likelihood of having experienced a non-
restorative outcome in the 2 years before interview (assuming ongoing problems reach a non-
restorative solution) 
Non-restorative outcome to most 
serious problem in past 2 years 







External labour market     
Ease of finding similar or better job (ref. fairly/very easy):    
Not currently in work 0.033 0.024 1.36 0.177 
Fairly difficult 0.037 0.016 2.26 0.028 
Very difficult 0.057 0.020 2.88 0.005 
     
Product market     
Internal rate of return -0.080 0.065 -1.23 0.222 
     
Change in labour's share of value-added (ref. Increase of 4% or more):  
Increase of 0.6-2.3% -0.006 0.020 -0.32 0.747 
Increase of 0.1-0.5% 0.026 0.024 1.05 0.296 
Decrease 0.029 0.023 1.25 0.216 
     
Job characteristics     
No written contract of employment 0.092 0.021 4.47 0.000 
     
In temporary job -0.016 0.028 -0.57 0.573 
     
Agency worker -0.084 0.051 -1.64 0.107 
     
Occupation (ref. Managerial, intermediate and own-account):  
Lower supervisory/technical/semi-routine 0.008 0.018 0.43 0.669 
Routine 0.013 0.025 0.52 0.602 
     
Earnings in current / most recent job (ref. 
£25,000 or more):     
Refused / Don’t know 0.020 0.030 0.69 0.494 
Earn less than £25,000 0.043 0.018 2.42 0.019 
     
Work less than 4 days a week 0.000 0.021 -0.02 0.983 
     
No-one at work to discuss work-related 
problems with 0.089 0.022 4.08 0.000 
     
Employer/firm characteristics     
Family-owned/Charity 0.030 0.019 1.57 0.122 




Table 12 continued  
Non-restorative outcome to most 
serious problem in past 2 years 







     
Organisation size (ref. 250+ employees):     
Less than 10 employees -0.036 0.030 -1.18 0.241 
10-49 employees -0.045 0.024 -1.85 0.069 
50-249 employees -0.023 0.024 -0.96 0.339 
Don't know -0.041 0.026 -1.54 0.128 
     
Union threat (ref. Union recognition):     
No recognition, industry union density 42% 
or more -0.021 0.025 -0.82 0.415 
No recognition, union density 22-42% -0.008 0.023 -0.36 0.719 
No recognition, union density 10-21% 0.009 0.023 0.40 0.688 
No recognition, union density less than 
10% -0.001 0.022 -0.06 0.955 
     
No HR department 0.015 0.020 0.74 0.464 
     
Relationship between managers and employees (ref. Very good): 
Quite good 0.081 0.015 5.55 0.000 
Not very good 0.228 0.023 9.87 0.000 
Not at all good 0.282 0.038 7.47 0.000 
     
Employer thought to prefer certain types of 
workers 0.110 0.024 4.64 0.000 
     
Employee characteristics     
Highest educational qualification (ref. None):   
Higher degree or post-graduate 0.009 0.034 0.26 0.798 
Degree (undergraduate) 0.033 0.032 1.03 0.307 
Diplomas in higher education 0.021 0.031 0.66 0.511 
A-/AS-levels/SCE higher 0.030 0.029 1.04 0.304 
O-level/GCSE grades A-C -0.020 0.030 -0.67 0.507 
O level/GCSE grades D-G -0.042 0.033 -1.29 0.200 
Other 0.030 0.041 0.73 0.469 
     
Number of days off sick in past year (ref. 5 or less):   
6-10 days 0.020 0.021 0.94 0.350 
11 days or more 0.054 0.022 2.43 0.018 




Table 12 continued  
Non-restorative outcome to most 
serious problem in past 2 years 







     
Age (ref. 50 and over):     
16-24 0.080 0.027 3.00 0.004 
25-32 0.044 0.022 1.99 0.051 
33-40 0.029 0.022 1.30 0.198 
41-49 0.031 0.021 1.49 0.142 
     
Awareness of employment rights 0.002 0.003 0.76 0.453 
Not asked questions on awareness of 
employment rights -0.014 0.016 -0.83 0.411 
     
Would go to Acas for information on rights 
at work -0.012 0.022 -0.55 0.584 
Not asked questions on places would seek 
advice on rights 0.008 0.017 0.50 0.618 
     
Not competent in spoken English -0.089 0.059 -1.49 0.141 
     
Female 0.029 0.015 1.92 0.059 
     
Black or Asian (ref. White or mixed race) -0.025 0.034 -0.73 0.466 
     
Long-standing health problem 0.050 0.021 2.44 0.018 
     
Not heterosexual 0.117 0.044 2.66 0.010 
     
Whether migrant (ref. Non-migrant):     
EU migrant -0.034 0.044 -0.77 0.442 
Non-EU migrant -0.026 0.033 -0.81 0.420 
     
Financial position (ref. Manage very/quite well):   
Get by alright 0.043 0.015 2.96 0.004 
Don't manage very well 0.099 0.034 2.90 0.005 
Have some/deep financial difficulties 0.155 0.031 4.95 0.000 
     
Not living with someone as a couple -0.013 0.016 -0.81 0.422 
     
Dependent children under 18 in household -0.010 0.017 -0.59 0.556 
     
Cares for ill or disabled family or friends 0.014 0.019 0.71 0.478 




Table 12 continued  
Non-restorative outcome to most 
serious problem in past 2 years 







     
Don't have someone close to talk about 
personal things -0.023 0.033 -0.68 0.500 
     
Personal relationship     
Related to manager or employer 0.006 0.033 0.18 0.855 
     
Source: Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
*F=6.98; Weighted and based on 3,181 responses. 
 
Table 13 and Table 14 show that the pseudo R2 of the model presented in Table 12 
represented an improvement over that used in Fevre et al. (from 0.236 to 0.312) 
when it was assumed that ongoing outcomes reached a negative resolution. The 
classification tables show that the model used in Table 12 predicted a greater 
proportion of non-restorative outcomes correctly compared to the model used by 
Fevre et al.   
Table 13 : Non-restorative outcome in the 2 years before interview (assuming ongoing 
problems reach a non-restorative solution), classification table based on the model used in 
Table B10.3 of Fevre et al. 2009 
 Predicted  
Observed No Yes % Correct 
No 2,347 80 96.7 
Yes 383 116 23.2 
Overall percentage 93.3 6.7 84.2 
  
Pseudo R2   0.236 
  
Source: Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
*Weighted and based on 2,926 responses 
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Table 14: Non-restorative outcome in the 2 years before interview (assuming ongoing problems 
reach a non-restorative solution), classification table based on the model used in Table 12 
 Predicted  
Observed No Yes % Correct 
No 2,347 80 96.7 
Yes 372 127 25.5 
Overall percentage 92.9 7.1 84.6 
  
Pseudo R2   0.312 
  
Source: Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 
*Weighted and based on 2,926 responses 
4.4 Summary 
The descriptive and multivariate analysis investigated the extent to which employees’ 
reported experience of adverse treatment varied according to a range of 
characteristics relating to the external labour market, the product market, their job, 
their employing organisation and their own personal characteristics.  
A number of the hypotheses raised in Section 2.3 received support from the analysis. 
In particular, adverse treatment was found to be more commonly experienced, all 
other things equal, by those with limited options in the external labour market. It was 
also found to be more commonly experienced by those without a written contract of 
employment, those without colleagues with whom they can discuss work-related 
problems, those working in organisations with a poor climate of employment relations 
and those who consider that their employer discriminates in favour of certain types of 
worker. Adverse treatment was also found to be more common among younger 
workers, among those with long-standing health problems and those with some/deep 
financial difficulties. Other factors, such as the nature of the external product market, 
the threat of unionisation, awareness of Acas and not being heterosexual were found 
to be important in some of the analyses, but not all.  
Overall, the results of the analysis support the notion that vulnerability to adverse 
treatment is a function of a variety of characteristics. Some of these concern the 
specific nature of the job that an employee may be doing, but others affect the 
employment relationship from a distance. There is also considerable support for the 
notion that it is those factors which most affect the balance of power within the 
employment relationship which most readily indicate the degree of vulnerability to 
adverse treatment.  
It is, nevertheless, the case that a reasonable degree of the variation in the 
experience of employees remains unexplained by our specifications. Clearly the 
predictive power of the models could be improved if more explanatory variables were 
observed in the Fair Treatment at Work Survey. We noted in Section 3.3 that some 
characteristics which could be expected to help explain the occurrence (or absence) 
of adverse treatment were not observed; these included the nature of the production 
regime in the organisation and the employer’s awareness of employment rights. But 
equally, there are some features of the interaction between a manager and an 
employee that are arguably unobservable in a simple survey enquiry. For example, 
 51
 52
one cannot expect to be able to observe all of the pressures acting upon a manager, 
nor to observe the way in which the employment relationship between manager and 
employee has developed over time. For this reason, it is necessarily the case that a 
portion of an employee’s vulnerability to adverse treatment will remain unexplained in 
such investigations.  
Having said this, we consider that the models we have discussed in this chapter go 
some considerable way to improving our understanding of vulnerability to adverse 
treatment in the workplace. We have proposed a number of factors which prove to be 
statistically associated the experience of adverse treatment at work. Furthermore, we 
would argue that the fact that many of these factors are grounded in theoretical 
propositions about the origins of power in the labour market adds further weight to 







This report has sought to investigate the characteristics which make employees 
more or less vulnerable to adverse treatment in the workplace. The patterns of 
adverse treatment, and the factors which increase employees’ vulnerability to it, 
were explored using the Fair Treatment at Work Survey 2008 (FTWS 2008) 
which asked respondents, among other things, about problems they had 
experienced at work. Such problems encompassed issues covered by 
employment rights legislation and more generalised perceptions of unfair 
treatment.  
The descriptive and multivariate analysis investigated the extent to which 
employees’ reported experience of adverse treatment varied according to a range 
of characteristics relating to the external labour market, the product market, their 
job, their employing organisation and their own personal characteristics. The 
analysis was built upon a conceptual approach which viewed adverse treatment 
as one possible (although not inevitable) consequence of the power imbalances 
which may exist within the employment relationship.  
Adverse treatment was found to be more commonly experienced, all other things 
equal, by those with limited options in the external labour market. It was also 
found to be more commonly experienced by those without a written contract of 
employment, those without colleagues with whom they can discuss work-related 
problems, those working in organisations with a poor climate of employment 
relations and those who consider that their employer discriminates in favour of 
certain types of worker. Adverse treatment was also found to be more common 
among younger workers, among those with long-standing health problems and 
those with some/deep financial difficulties. Other factors, such as the nature of 
the product market, the absence of a threat of unionisation and a lack of 
awareness of Acas and not being heterosexual were found to be important in 
some of the analyses, but not all.  
These results have a number of implications. First, they suggest that the 
prevalence of adverse treatment may have a cyclical component since 
vulnerability was found to be related to an employee’s ease of re-employment. 
The precise nature of the relationship is difficult to estimate without a longer run 
of data. However, the results suggest that the prevalence of adverse treatment 
may be expected to be greater when employers’ demand for labour is reduced 
such that employees have fewer outside options.  
The results also suggest that adverse treatment may have a sectoral component 
related to the decline in the importance of labour costs within certain industries. 
The prevalence of automation, outsourcing and downsizing more generally may 
thus provide a useful signal of rising employee vulnerability within certain sectors. 
This further suggests that employee vulnerability to adverse treatment in Britain 
may link in to broader competitive processes of demand reallocation and 
globalisation.  
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The results provide only limited support for the notion that vulnerability to adverse 
treatment is primarily indicated by the characteristics of the jobs which individuals 
hold. In particular, the wage on offer in the job, the availability of union 
representation and the permanency of the employment contract – typically used 
in other work to identify ‘vulnerable workers’ – were not found to be particularly 
informative in this analysis. The prevalence of adverse treatment did not vary 
greatly with such characteristics in the bivariate analysis, and they were not 
typically found to be statistically significant predictors of vulnerability in the 
multivariate analysis. More informative among the job and employer 
characteristics considered in the analysis were the presence of a written contract 
of employment, the availability of social support from work colleagues and the 
general climate of employment relations within the workplace. These are, 
however, factors which are less amenable to policy intervention.  
There was strong support for the notion that certain types of individual are more 
vulnerable than others. Employees who report that they were experiencing 
financial difficulties, and who might therefore be expected to be particularly 
dependent upon the continuation of their current employment, are more likely to 
report having experienced adverse treatment at work. Policy making therefore 
needs to include an appreciation that factors outside of the employment 
relationship can influence upon how that relationship functions. Younger workers, 
those with disabilities and non-heterosexuals are also each more vulnerable to 
adverse treatment than their counterparts after controlling for other factors. These 
results suggest that policy initiatives could usefully be targeted at groups which 
have been brought more recently under the coverage of anti-discrimination 
legislation. Initiatives which seek to increase employers’ awareness of the ways 
in which these groups may be adversely treated, and initiatives which increase 
such workers’ capacity to protect themselves from adverse treatment – for 
example by increasing their awareness of sources of information and advice such 
as Acas, are likely to reduce the extent of their vulnerability in the future.  
The preceding discussion serves to highlight a further point, which is that 
vulnerability cannot be defined by reference only to a small number of 
characteristics. By highlighting a wide range of factors which influence an 
employee’s vulnerability to adverse treatment at work, the findings serve to 
emphasise that vulnerability is both complex in its make-up and also continuous 
in its nature. It is (in our view) an over-simplification to seek to categorise one 
group of workers who are vulnerable to adverse treatment (implying that the 
remainder are not). Vulnerability is instead a matter of degree. Furthermore, the 
factors which make an employee more vulnerable are wide and varied.  
As we sum up, it must be noted that the nature of the data makes it necessary to 
exercise some caution in the interpretation of the findings. Firstly, it is not 
possible to reach any firm conclusions about the direction of causation within a 
cross-sectional dataset. Secondly, the reliance on self-reported data by 
employees means that whether they report adverse treatment partly depends on 
their expectations about how they should be treated. If there is variation between 
particular groups of employees (for example, younger and older workers) in 
whether they regard a given type of behaviour as adverse treatment, this would 
affect the interpretation of results. However, confidence in the findings is 
increased by the fact that many of the results do fit the a priori theoretical 
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expectations set out in Section 2.3. For this reason, it can be argued that the 
analysis and findings provide a valuable insight into understanding the correlates 
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Annex A: Questions used 
to derive indicators of 
adverse treatment 
 
General indicator of perceived adverse treatment 
5.2 
Which of these problems have you experienced in the last TWO years, that is, 
since MONTH 2006? MULTICODE 
 
…Taking parental leave – that is taking a set amount of unpaid time off 
work to spend with your children 
…Taking time off to look after a dependent child or relative in an 
 emergency 
…Maternity or paternity leave/pay 
…Adoption leave or pay 
…Holiday entitlement/holiday pay 
…Taking rest breaks at work 
…The number of hours or days you were required to work 
…Problems to do with pay 
…Your rights as an agency worker/temp 
…Your rights as a part-time worker 
…Receiving a contract or written statement of the terms and conditions of 
 your job 
…Your employer not following a set procedure when dealing with a 
 complaint against you or a problem with your performance at work 
…Your employer not following a set procedure when dealing with a 
 grievance or other work related problem which you had 
…Being unfairly dismissed 
…Problems to do with Health and Safety at work 
…Problems to do with taking time off sick or sick pay 
…Problems to do with retirement 
 
Yes – with current / most recent employer  
Yes – with a PREVIOUS employer 
No 
5.4 
And now, I’d like to ask you about other problems at work. In the last TWO years, 
have you ever been treated unfairly compared to others in your workplace? 
 
Yes – with current / most recent employer  





In the last TWO years, do you think you have experienced discrimination at 
work? 
 
Yes – with current / most recent employer  




Sex-based harassment at work is any unwelcome sex or gender related 
behaviour that creates a hostile working environment. In the last TWO years, 
have you experienced sex-based harassment at work? This could be sexual in 
nature or be related to the fact you are a man/woman. CODE ALL THAT APPLY 
 
Yes – it was sexual in nature 





Now I would like you to think about other forms of bullying and harassment (not 
sexual harassment) that create a hostile working environment. In the last TWO 
years, have you experienced bullying or harassment at work? 
 
Yes – with current / most recent employer  




Restorative and non-restorative solutions 
6.35a 






If ‘No’ at 6.35a: 
6.35c 
Which of these best describes how this problem or dispute was resolved? SHOW 
SCREEN 
 
My employer took action to address my problem/complaint 
I took action to address my employer’s problem/complaint 
My employer and I came to a compromise 
I moved jobs within the organisation 
Nothing/just went on as before/forgot about it 
Someone else resigned/was dismissed 
Other (please specify) 
DK 
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Annex B: Estimated 
incidence of characteristics  








Dependent variables    
Any problem in last 2 years 0.292 0.008 4000 
    
Non-restorative outcome to most serious problem 0.075 0.005 3460 
    
Non-restorative outcome to most serious problem 
(assuming ongoing reach non-restorative solution 0.181 0.007 3908 
    
External labour market    
Ease of finding similar/better job:    
Not currently in work 0.082 0.005 3869 
Fairly/very easy 0.465 0.009 3869 
Fairly difficult 0.301 0.008 3869 
Very difficult 0.153 0.006 3869 
    
Product market    
Internal rate of return:    
Less than 1.9% 0.228 0.008 3988 
1.9-5.0% 0.236 0.007 3988 
5.1-13.0% 0.273 0.008 3988 
13.0% or more 0.263 0.008 3988 




Table B1 continued  




    
Change in labour's share of value-added:    
Increase of 4% or more 0.262 0.008 3991 
Increase of 0.6-2.3% 0.349 0.009 3991 
Increase of 0.1-0.5% 0.145 0.006 3991 
Decrease 0.245 0.008 3991 
    
Job characteristics    
No written contract of employment 0.122 0.006 3978 
    
In temporary job 0.083 0.005 4005 
    
Agency worker 0.032 0.003 4010 
    
Occupation:    
Managerial, intermediate and own-account 0.584 0.009 3961 
Lower supervisory/technical/semi-routine 0.283 0.008 3961 
Routine 0.134 0.006 3961 
    
Earnings in current / most recent job:    
Refused / Don’t know 0.080 0.005 4010 
Earn less than £25,000 0.602 0.009 4010 
Earn £25,000 or more 0.318 0.008 4010 
    
Work less than 4 days a week 0.143 0.007 4010 
    
No-one at work to discuss work-related problems with 0.096 0.005 3979 
    
Employer/firm characteristics    
Family-owned/Charity 0.178 0.007 3950 
    
Organisation size:    
Less than 10 employees 0.092 0.005 4010 
10-49 employees 0.102 0.005 4010 
50-249 employees 0.098 0.005 4010 
250+ employees 0.588 0.009 4010 
Don't know 0.119 0.006 4010 




Table B1 continued  




    
Union threat:    
Union recognition 0.391 0.009 3873 
No recognition, industry union density 42% or more 0.103 0.006 3873 
No recognition, union density 22-42% 0.152 0.007 3873 
No recognition, union density 10-21% 0.179 0.007 3873 
No recognition, union density less than 10% 0.174 0.007 3873 
    
No HR department 0.245 0.008 3903 
    
Relationship between managers and employees:    
Very good 0.458 0.009 3980 
Quite good 0.432 0.009 3980 
Not very good 0.084 0.005 3980 
Not at all good 0.026 0.003 3980 
    
Employer thought to prefer certain types of workers 0.062 0.004 3890 
    
Employee characteristics    
Highest educational qualification:    
Higher degree or post-graduate 0.125 0.006 3994 
Degree (undergraduate) 0.154 0.006 3994 
Diplomas in higher education 0.118 0.006 3994 
A-/AS-levels/SCE higher 0.189 0.007 3994 
O-level/GCSE grades A-C 0.190 0.007 3994 
O level/GCSE grades D-G 0.086 0.005 3994 
Other 0.046 0.004 3994 
None 0.091 0.005 3994 
    
Number of days off sick in past year:    
5 or less 0.822 0.007 3934 
6-10 days 0.081 0.005 3934 
11 days or more 0.097 0.005 3934 
    
Age:    
16-24 0.153 0.007 4010 
25-32 0.185 0.007 4010 
33-40 0.185 0.007 4010 
41-49 0.223 0.007 4010 
50 or more 0.254 0.008 4010 




Table B1 continued  




    
Awareness of employment rights (mean on 30-items 
scale) 23.2 0.059 4010 
Not asked questions on awareness of employment 
rights 0.329 0.008 4010 
    
Would go to Acas for information on rights at work 0.124 0.006 3958 
Not asked questions on places would seek advice on 
rights 0.348 0.009 4010 
    
Not competent in spoken English 0.033 0.003 4010 
    
Female 0.489 0.009 4010 
    
Black or Asian (ref. White or mixed race) 0.093 0.005 4001 
    
Long-standing health problem 0.118 0.006 4001 
    
Not heterosexual 0.020 0.003 3947 
    
Non-migrant 0.870 0.006 4000 
EU migrant 0.041 0.004 4000 
Non-EU migrant 0.089 0.005 4000 
    
Financial position:    
Manage very/quite well 0.590 0.009 3979 
Get by alright 0.332 0.008 3979 
Don't manage very well 0.035 0.003 3979 
Have some/deep financial difficulties 0.043 0.003 3979 
    
Not living with someone as a couple 0.355 0.009 3996 
    
Dependent children under 18 in household 0.390 0.009 4001 
    
Cares for ill or disabled family or friends 0.119 0.006 4007 
    
Don't have someone close to talk about personal 
things 0.036 0.003 4002 
    
Personal relationship    
Related to manager or employer 0.040 0.003 4007 
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